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Abstract: 
The 2007-2009 crisis has led to a return of Keynesian analyses and policies. The paper analyses the 
contradictions between a structural crisis, the implementation at a very large scale of Keynesian 
policies and the denial to undermine financial capitalism. The crisis has led the French government to 
endorse French traditional views according to which government actions have a major role. Although 
stimulus measures have been limited in France, the economy has been less affected than others thanks 
to the size of its automatic stabilisers and financial and economic archaisms. However the French 
government has not abandoned the objective of large public expenditure cuts. European authorities 
have had to admit that public deficits would rise but they have not implemented coordinated stimulus 
policies. EU countries are still requested to bring their budgetary positions back into balance, 
independently of economic developments. Yet the rise in public deficits and debts has not generated 
any rise in long-term interest rates and in inflation expectations. Two main issues remain: can fiscal 
and monetary policies alone be expected to boost activity if the roots of the crisis lie in structural 
imbalances? Will fiscal exit strategies be an opportunity for leading classes to cut massively social and 
public expenditures?  
 
Résumé : La crise financière des années 2007-2009 a conduit à un retour en force des analyses et des 
politiques keynésiennes. L’article analyse les contradictions entre une crise de nature structurelle, la 
mise en œuvre à une très large échelle de remèdes de type keynésien et le refus de remettre en cause le 
capitalisme financier. La crise a amené le gouvernement français à retrouver les positions françaises 
traditionnelles sur l’importance des interventions publiques. Les mesures de soutien à l’activité ont été 
limitées, mais la France a été protégée par l’importance de ses stabilisateurs automatiques et ses 
archaïsmes économiques et financiers. Le gouvernement n’a toutefois pas renoncé à l’objectif de 
fortes réductions des dépenses publiques. Les instances européennes se sont résigné au gonflement des 
déficits publics, mais n’ont guère organisé une stratégie coordonnée de relance. Elles continuent à 
réclamer des engagements de retour à l’équilibre des finances publiques, indépendamment de 
l’évolution conjoncturelle. Pourtant, la hausse des déficits et des dettes publiques n’a pas provoqué de 
hausse des taux longs et des anticipations d’inflation. Deux grandes questions demeurent : les 
politiques budgétaires et monétaires de soutien peuvent-elles permettre à elles seules de relancer la 
croissance si la crise est causé par des déséquilibres structurels ? Les classes dirigeantes réussiront-
elles à utiliser le déséquilibre actuel des finances publiques pour réduire massivement les dépenses 
publiques et sociales ?  
 
JEL code: E62 
Keywords: Financial crisis, fiscal policies, French economy, EU economies. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-2009 crisis has led to a return of Keynesian analyses and policies, which contrasts 
with the 1980-2007 period when liberal analyses and policies were prevailing. However, this 
return of Keynesian analyses and policies may soon come to an end, since the pre-crisis 
mainstream liberal views were matching the interests and policies of new leading classes, the 
winners of financial and economic globalisation. In France, Nicolas Sarkozy’s government 
had the objective of introducing a break in the French model, based on large public spending 
and taxation, assumed to be detrimental to labour, savings, investment and competiveness. 
But the crisis has led the government to change their objectives and call for a re-foundation of 
capitalism, which would reduce the weight of finance at the benefit of entrepreneurs and 
workers. The paper analyses the contradictions between a structural crisis, the implementation 
of Keynesian policies at a very large scale and the denial to undermine financial capitalism. 
Section 2 puts in contrast the Keynesian features and the structural causes of the crisis: the 
growth model chosen by the winners of globalisation, China’s and Germany’s mercantilism, 
the rise in inequalities associated with rising indebtedness and financial bubbles in Anglo-
Saxon economies; financial globalisation boosted by greedy and adventurous financial 
institutions. Keynesian remedies proposed and implemented in G-20 countries are described.  
Section 3 focuses on French specificities: the weight of taxes and public spending, a large 
redistribution, persisting large public deficits, the difficulty of implementing liberal reforms. 
Structural fiscal policies implemented before the crisis are analysed: tax cuts, followed by 
spending cuts, efforts to generate a supply shock. The crisis has led the French government to 
endorse French traditional views on the importance of world governance, on financial 
regulation, on government support to domestic industries, on social protection. Stimulus 
measures have been limited, and hardly targeted on the victims of the crisis: the unemployed, 
especially the young, companies and industry sectors in difficulty. But the French economy 
was less affected than other economies thanks to the size of its automatic stabilisers and 
financial and economic archaisms. The government has let the public deficit and debt rise, but 
has not abandoned the objective of large public expenditure cuts, which it could impose in the 
coming years under the EU commitments of bringing back budgetary positions into balance. 
Section 4 analyses the EU strategy during the crisis. European authorities have had to admit 
that public deficits would rise but they have hardly implemented coordinated stimulus 
policies. Fiscal stimulus packages have been much smaller in the euro area than in the US or 
in the UK. The EU Commission still requests Member States to bring their budgetary 
positions back into balance, independently of economic developments. The Commission does 
not draw lessons from the crisis and maintains its liberal reforms strategy. Several economists 
recommend cutting public deficits through large spending cuts (and not through higher 
growth or wealth and speculative profit taxation). They call for governments to reassure 
markets by announcing large cuts in pensions and health expenditure. Yet the rise in public 
deficits and debts has generated no rise in long-term interest rates and in inflation 
expectations.  
Two main issues remain: can fiscal and monetary policies alone be expected to boost activity 
if the roots of the crisis lie in structural imbalances? Will fiscal exit strategies be an 
opportunity for leading classes to cut massively social and public expenditures?  
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2. Economic policies in the crisis 
2.1. Short-term and structural issues 
The 2007-2009 crisis can be analysed as a Keynesian crisis of insufficient demand. The fall in 
equity prices has led to a substantial fall in households’ wealth. The impact was particularly 
large in Anglo-Saxon economies, where households hold a larger amount of equities, where a 
large part of retirement pensions is based on pension funds. Under the effects of the banking 
crisis, banks in difficulty had to cut lending to households and companies. The equity market 
crisis reduced the value of companies and hence made them financially more fragile, which 
reduced their capacity to borrow. Growth prospects were rapidly downgraded. Companies 
reduced their investments. The fear of unemployment led households to increase their savings 
ratio. Lower spending led output and incomes to fall. The crisis has spread around the world 
through foreign trade contraction and flight to quality in financial markets, which limited the 
capacity of many emerging countries to borrow. 
The world economy entered a depressive spiral, the opposite of the strong growth that had 
taken place under the effects of trade globalisation, financial globalisation and rapid economic 
growth of emerging countries in the 1995-2007 period. 
All countries were affected but the output fall was especially dramatic in Russia, the NMS, 
Ireland, Finland, Spain, Sweden and UK while it was relatively limited in the US, France, 
Portugal and Africa (see Table 1).  
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policy answers are needed to tackle the crisis. Central 
banks have responded by cutting their base rates to lowest floors: 0-0.25% for the Fed, 0.1% 
for the Bank of Japan, 0.5% for the Bank of England, 1% for the ECB. Besides, central banks 
have provided huge liquidity to banks; they have provided support to financial markets in 
difficulty through widening their refinancing conditions; they have used non conventional 
tools to signal clearly to financial markets that they will durably maintain low interest rates. In 
many countries, governments intervened by recapitalizing banks and guaranteeing their 
deposits and their loans. 
Active fiscal policies have then been implemented to such an extent that according to the June 
2009 OECD estimates, fiscal deficits will exceed 6% of GDP in 2010 in almost all large 
economies, reaching 14% of GDP in the UK, 11% in the US, 8.7% in Japan, 8.5% in France, 
7% in the euro area, 6% in Italy and Germany.  
The crisis has destroyed the liberal point of view that the market economy was fundamentally 
stable and did not need government interventions. The view according to which only supply 
policies matter and demand policy should be restricted to monetary policy alone was 
forgotten. Policy-makers now agree that fiscal polices are needed to get out of the crisis. 
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Table 1. GDP Growth Prospects, in % 
  Weight 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Germany 4.4 2.6 1.0 -4.9 1.1 
France 3.2 2.2 0.3 -2.1 0.8 
Italy 2.8 1.4 -1.0 -4.8 0.6 
Spain 2.1 3.7 0.9 -3.7 -0.1 
Netherlands 1.0 3.5 2.0 -4.1 1.1 
Belgium 0.6 2.8 1.0 -2.9 0.7 
Austria 0.5 3.1 2.1 -3.7 0.7 
Finland 0.6 4.4 0.8 -6.9 0.8 
Portugal 0.4 1.8 0.0 -2.9 0.3 
Greece 0.3 4.0 2.9 -0.2 0.7 
Ireland 0.3 6.0 -3.2 -6.8 -0.2 
Euro area  16.4 2.6 0.6 -3.8 0.8 
UK 3.4 3.0 0.6 -4.4 1.0 
Sweden 0.5 2.9 -0.4 -4.7 1.2 
Denmark 0.3 1.7 -1.2 -3.3 0.4 
EU-15 20.5 2.7 0.5 -4.1 0.8 
NMS 2.7 6.1 4.0 -4.1 0.6 
EU-27 23.3 3.0 0.9 -4.0 0.7 
Switzerland 0.5 3.3 1.8 -1.8 0.3 
Norway 0.4 6.3 2.1 -1.0 1.8 
Europe  24.1 3.2 0.9 -4.0 0.8 
USA 21.8 2.0 0.4 -2.5 1.9 
Japan 6.7 2.0 -0.7 -5.9 2.2 
Canada 2.0 2.7 0.4 -2.6 1.7 
Industrial countries 56.3 2.5 0.5 -3.5 1.4 
EU candidates 1.2 4.6 1.1 -6.5 3.4 
Russia 3.2 8.1 5.6 -7.3 2.3 
Other CIS 1.3 8.8 5.4 -7.2 1.6 
China 11.0 11.9 9.0 8.0 9.4 
Other Asian countries 13.2 7.3 5.1 2.3 5.4 
Latin America 7.9 5.6 3.9 -3.0 2.4 
Africa 3.4 6.2 5.2 1.7 4.1 
Middle East  2.5 5.8 5.4 2.0 4.3 
World 100.0 4.9 2.8 -1.3 3.1 
Source: OFCE forecasts, October 2009. 
However, the nature of the crisis needs to be addressed. The origins of the crisis lie in 
fundamental imbalances of the world economy, directly linked to production, trade and 
financial globalization. Is it possible to get out the crisis without questioning the functioning 
of the recent global financial capitalism?  
The crisis questions growth strategies of the largest economies which were the winners of 
globalisation. These countries have chosen two types of extremely contrasted strategies:   
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– Anglo-Saxon economies have opted for a growth strategy characterised by the stagnation of 
wage earnings and incomes of most households and rising income inequalities (table 2) offset 
by rising households’ indebtedness and financial and housing bubbles. US have supported this 
type of growth through maintaining low real interest rates which allowed for rising 
indebtedness and generated rises in assets prices. 
– A large number of countries, like Germany and China, have implemented a “mercantilist” 
growth strategy based on external demand with low domestic wages and the accumulation of 
external surpluses. Their growth occurred at the detriment of trade partners who had to 
accumulate deficits.  
Table 2. Interdecile ratio D9/D1 
 1985 2005 
United States 5.5 5.9 
Italy 3.9 4.3 
United Kingdom 3.8 4.2 
Germany 3.0 4.0 
France 3.6 3.4 
Sweden 2.4 2.8 
Source: OECD. 
The configuration of the current account was deeply unbalanced (table 3). The countries 
(China, Germany) which based their growth on exports accumulated huge external assets 
while the Anglo-Saxon countries, able to attract foreign capitals, due to their sophisticated 
financial system, accumulated unsustainable deficits. Many emerging countries were 
unwilling to rely on financial markets spirits and to be at risk of asking support from IMF, 
chose to accumulate surpluses.  
The countries which had based output growth on wage restraint and external surpluses created 
a shortfall of aggregate demand which had to be compensated. In the years before the crisis, 
this has been done by public deficits in some countries, by low interest rates driven by the US 
Federal Reserve policy which induced the development of private credit and financial and real 
estate bubbles. Due to trade globalization and leading classes’ interests, countries refused to 
support demand by increasing wages or social expenses.  
The US economy massively supported world growth; the US external deficit was a more a 
sign of growing imbalances than a medicine for reducing world imbalances. The US became 
progressively unable to continue to play a leadership role in terms of global growth. 
The economic developments in the years 1995-2007 led to deep macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances, which was neither satisfactory nor stable. 
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Table 3. Current account balances, in 2007 and 2008 
 Billions 
dollars, 2007 
% of GDP Billions 
dollars, 2008 
% of GDP 
United States -727 -5.2 -706 -4.9 
United Kingdom -75 -2.7 -46 -1.7 
Euro Area 34 0.3 -93 -0.7 
Germany 250 7.5 235 6.4 
Netherlands 60 7.6 66 7.5 
Portugal -21 -9.4 -30 -12.1 
France  -26 -1.0 -65 -2.3 
Italy -51 -2.4 -79 -3.4 
Greece -44 -14.2 -52 -14.4 
Spain  -144 -10.0 -154 -9.6 
Sweden-Denmark 41 5.4 41 40.6 
NMS  -83 -8.0 -98 -7.8 
Iceland -4 -19.9 -7 -40.6 
Japan 211 4.8 157 3.2 
Norway 62 15.9 88 19.5 
Switzerland 43 9.9 12 2.4 
China 372 11.0 426 9.8 
Other Asia 146 3.4 74 1.6 
Latina America 13 0.4 -30 -0.7 
Middle East 270 18.1 347 18.3 
Africa 32 2.9 32 2.5 
Australia/Canada/N. Zealand -53 -2.2 -50 -1.9 
CIS (inc. Russia) 72 4.2 108 4.9 
Turkey -38 -5.8 -41 -5.7 
Other Central and Eastern Europe -15 -11.2 -22 -13.5 
World 299  191  
Source: IMF, WEO October 2009. 
The crisis was mainly caused by the excessive size of the financial sector, the large amounts 
of capital available, the cupidity of capital owners and the adventurous strategies of banks and 
financial institutions. Since the early 1980’s, financial markets and institutions have 
developed incredibly in the world economy, dealing with huge amounts of capital flows in 
search of high profitability unrelated to real performances. Through a succession of booms 
and bursts, globalisation has shown once again that financial markets are myopic, instable, 
herdic and cyclothymic. Financial globalisation allows for a durable increase of imbalances 
which burst at some point. Exchange rates instability and unpredictability, stock market 
bubbles, credit excessive growth show that financial markets exacerbate economic instability 
instead of playing a stabilizing role.  
The triumph of liberalism was a Pyrrhic victory. Markets have been unable to ensure a stable, 
durable world growth. Thus, the 2007-2008 crisis has destroyed the theoretical bases of global 
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finance and led world financial markets to implode. The crisis questions the sustainability of 
global economy dominated by financial markets, without world economic governance.  
The financial crisis is accompanied by an environmental crisis with immediate economic 
consequences. Consumption and production patterns will have to change due to depletion of 
energy resources and environmental constraints, which raises uncertainty for many economic 
sectors. 
Domestic strategies, world economic governance and financial markets functioning need to be 
questioned. A strong monetary and financial support is needed to bring the economy out of 
the crisis, but restoring confidence in a satisfying growth requests to define a new world 
economic growth model. The financial and banking system needs to work again properly but 
here also the issue of a new functioning of finance has to be raised. There is a need for a re-
foundation of capitalism. 
A new world economic strategy needs to be implemented to restore a durable growth.  
1. Growth should be based on domestic demand and not on exports; consumption should 
be based on wages and not on borrowing or capital gains. 
2. Companies should pay less attention to the value for their shareholders and more on 
jobs and output. This implies a redistribution of power in the firms.  
3. World growth must become less intensive in energy, raw materials, greenhouse gas 
emissions and pollution. This requires a world regulation, a concerted environmental 
taxation, settling a World Environment Organisation with substantial powers. 
Government should help their companies to shift their production techniques towards 
green growth (transportation, buildings,…). 
4. Financial returns required by markets should be lowered; the role of financial markets 
and the weight of speculation should be reduced; the banking system should be re-
focused on its missions to finance productive investments. 
5. A world economic governance should be implemented. 
But where are the social forces which can impose such a change? The winners of the 
globalisation refuse to change the growth model of 1995-2007. How to implement global 
economic governance that would arbitrate between conflicting interests between countries and 
social classes? Will capitalism be able to find a new robust growth without curing the factors 
which induced the imbalances which caused the crisis?   
2.2. The G-20 summits 
Three G-20 summits were held during the crisis (Washington, 15 November 2008; London, 2 
April 2009; Pittsburgh, 25 September 2009). The US, supported by the IMF, wishes the 
meetings to focus on how to revive world economic growth. On the contrary, EU countries 
consider that the G-20 should tackle in priority the issue of improving world economic 
governance and financial markets regulation, observing that world economic governance 
failure and financial markets deregulation were at the origins of the crisis. 
There is probably a need to pursue both objectives: the need for active policy measures should 
not hide the need for deep reforms. A substantial fiscal and monetary stimulus is required to 
bring economic recovery, but restoring confidence in a sustainable and durable growth 
requires the design of a new world growth model. Banking and financial systems need to 
Global financial crisis: the French policy answer in a EU perspective 
 8
function properly again; although, here also, the implementation of a new functioning of the 
financial system is a major issue to be addressed. 
Short-term stabilisation policies often come in contradiction with structural issues. The 
stimulus objective requires that interest rates remain durably low and that banks are massively 
rescued so that they can rapidly provide lending; the reform objective advocates for 
preventing the emergence of financial bubbles, hence for a tighter credit control.   
The G20 summits laid the blueprint for a better governance of the world economy and a better 
regulation of financial markets, although we can consider they do not go far enough in these 
two subjects. 
In most countries, fiscal and monetary policies have responded vigorously to the crisis. There 
was no coordination problem, even if the instruments used were not identical. Similar fiscal 
actions are desirable as concerns stabilisation policies, while differentiated measures should 
be introduced as concerns structural developments. It would make sense that countries with 
unsustainable external deficits and particularly hit by the financial crisis (US, UK) allow their 
exchange rates to depreciate while countries running external surpluses (like China) let their 
exchange rate rise significantly. Countries running surpluses should have implemented larger 
expansionary measures than others; wages should have been increased in order to raise 
domestic consumption in countries like Germany and China.   
Openly protectionist measures have been very rare. It is not shocking that countries 
implement stimulus measures mostly benefitting their producers. It is not shocking that 
countries introduce specific support to industry sectors most affected by the crisis and help 
these sectors to adopt more environmentally friendly production processes. 
In September 2009, the Pittsburgh summit reaffirmed the need to maintain measures to 
support activity as unemployment rates remain high. It is not appropriate cut public deficits 
now, even if it is said that in the future coordinated strategies to end the crisis would have to 
be developed. 
The need for global economic governance has been reaffirmed. It should be ensured by the 
G20, with the help of the IMF. The G-20 took the commitment to challenge their national 
economic strategies: structural deficit countries will increase their private savings rate and cut 
their public deficits, countries with structural surpluses will increase domestic demand. But 
this would require exchange rates realignments, which the G-20 does not organise, simply 
writing that exchange rates should “reflect underlying economic fundamentals”. The G-20 
countries will have undertaken structural reforms (but their contents are not specified) and 
will improve their “social safety nets”. It remains to be seen whether the G-20’s commitment 
will be held, especially by the countries at the origins of the imbalances: the US, China, 
Germany...  
The G-20 took the commitment to collectively monitor the evolution of the global economy to 
ensure that implemented economic policies allow for “a strong, sustainable and balanced 
growth”, to identify risks (particularly financial risks) and to suggest adjustments. The IMF 
should help “its members to cope with financial volatility”, reducing the perceived need for 
excessive reserve accumulation" and “strengthen its ability “to provide even-handed, candid 
and independent surveillance of the risks facing the global economy and the international 
financial system”. Meanwhile, the G-20 is refusing to “restrict capital flows”, to fight against 
speculative behaviours, to settle more stable financing laws or to reorganize the International 
Monetary System. 
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The G-20 recognizes that the crisis was induced by “reckless and irresponsible unconscious 
risks” taken by banks and financial institutions. The objective remains to better control the 
institutions and financial markets, but not to greatly reduce their role and their weight. Banks 
will have to hold more capital, especially to cover market risk, securitized credit and off-
balance assets. The capital requirements will be anti-cyclical. But the risk remains that banks 
fulfil these requirements by reducing their lending to businesses and households or by 
increasing their profits. The G-20 does not prohibit banks from engaging in speculative 
activities or from lending to hedge funds; the G-20 did not consider to oblige banks to restrict 
their activity on the credit distribution to businesses and households and on safe and low-
remunerated assets. 
The derivatives markets should be more transparent, but the G-20 does not propose to strictly 
limit it to the coverage of actually held assets.  
All institutions whose failure could raise systemic risks should be subject to regulation. Large 
financial groups and cross-border groups will be better controlled. But the G-20 does not 
propose measures to reduce the size and the internationalisation of financial groups.  
Wage practices should be reformed: bonuses should be spread over time, should reflect risks 
exposure and should be recouped in case of losses. But traders’ incomes will not be capped 
and there was no agreement to harmonise their taxation at a high level.  
The G-20 welcomed the progress in the fight against tax and regulations heavens and agrees 
to continue. But the G-20 did not re-examine the list of these heavens; the G-20 maintained 
lax criteria for allowing a country to leave the list. The G-20 refused to take a strong measure: 
to prohibit financial institutions and firms to set up subsidiaries and to locate any financial (or 
having tax consequences) activity in these countries.  
There have been worrying signs more recently: banks are making high profits in 2009 by 
taking advantage of very low refinancing rates they did not fully passed on to borrowers; 
many banks have repaid State aids in order to recover rapidly their entire freedom; Anglo-
Saxon banks pay again high bonuses and compete again to attract traders to speculate like 
before; the crisis has caused mergers among financial institutions which can now benefit from 
their monopolistic situation to make huge profits (like Goldman Sachs and BNP-Paribas). The 
foreign exchange market is again unstable: the euro is appreciating and has come close to 
$1.50 which endangers EU firms’ competitiveness. World equity markets, which had dropped 
by about 55% from March 2007 to February 2009 have risen since by more than 40%. The 
global economy is not immune to the resurgence of asset bubbles.  
The G-20 has gone very far in the right direction, but the reforms hit the interests of large 
capital owners and financial sector leaders. They will try to delay reforms, hoping to quickly 
resume their activities as before, as they did after the implosion of the dot.com bubble. Will 
the willingness of reforms of the G-20 leaders be strong and durable enough? 
2.3. About expansionary monetary policies 
Central banks have responded to the crisis in cutting drastically their base rates, providing 
massive liquidity to banks and using non conventional tools (accepting lower quality assets as 
collateral and buying if necessary long term assets).   
However, in a deep crisis, monetary policy rapidly reaches limits. Low nominal interest rates 
remain high as compared to growth and inflation, especially as the spread between central 
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bank rate and credit or corporate bonds rates increases. At the beginning of 2009, the interest 
rate on the Aaa corporate bonds was 5.05% in the US, for a 1% expected GDP growth in 
value for 2009: the spread between the two variables was 4 percentage points, when it was 
only 0.5 in July 2007. In France, the interest rate for companies’ credit was 4.6% for a 1.3% 
expected growth of GDP in value in 2009; the spread was 3.3 points as compared to 1 point 
only in July 2007. Borrowing costs remain high for companies anticipating a decline or a 
stagnation of their prices and output. Uncertain economic prospects discourage companies 
and households to borrow and banks to lend. It is very difficult for monetary policy not to be 
pro-cyclical. 
Table 4. Interest rates and GDP growth expectations 
 June 07 January 08 June 08 January 09 June 09 
USA 
Fed funds 5.25 4.0 2.0 0.15 0.15 
Treasury 10-year 5.0 3.75 4.0 2.5 3.6 
Corporate bonds* 5.7/6.65 5.3/6.55 5.65/7.15 5.05/8.15 5.4/6.3 
Forecast GDP growth** 5.2 4.8 -3.2 1.0 3.9 
France 
ECB rate 4.0 4.0 4.2 2.3 1.0 
Treasury 10-year 4.6 4.15 4.7 3.6 3.7 
Companies credit rate 4.9 5.2 5.5 4.6 3.4 
Forecast GDP growth ** 3.9 3.75 -2.8 1.3 1.3 
*Aaa/Baa; ** In value 
Sources: Fed, Banque de France, OFCE calculations.  
In a financial economy, central banks face a difficult choice: should interest rates be durably 
maintained at very low levels at the risk of generating new financial and housing bubbles and 
hence giving again illusionary wealth to companies and households? 
2.4. What fiscal stimulus to tackle the crisis? 
In a situation of falling output, governments should respond through fiscal policy in allowing 
public deficits to rise.  
First the automatic stabilisers will play: they have the advantage of playing without delay and 
they can be reversed. They are larger in economies with a high level of public taxation, 
progressive taxation and unemployment benefits, larger in continental Europe than in Anglo-
Saxon economies. Second will come discretionary measures explicitly designed to support 
activity: rise in public spending and investment, tax cuts or increase in social benefits (table 
5).  
According to the 3T rule, stimulus measures should be timely, temporary and targeted. 
However, their temporariness may be questionable if the crisis has structural causes: for 
instance, inequalities have dramatically risen in Anglo-Saxon countries and social benefits 
may be increased on a permanent basis through higher taxation on the wealthiest; China needs 
to support durably consumption through the introduction of a decent social protection. 
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Table 5. Advantages and drawbacks of fiscal stimulus 
Measures Advantages Drawbacks 
Rise in public investment Temporary; direct effect on 
activity; useful for low run 
growth; no impact on the net 
public balance  
Too long lags; Too sector-
targeted  
Households’ direct taxation cuts Temporary Benefit to the wealthiest; small 
impact on consumption 
Rise in social benefits  Benefit to the poor; strong 
effect on consumption; 
cooperative 
Irreversibility risks 
Rise in unemployment benefits Temporary; benefit to people in 
difficulty; strong effect on 
consumption; cooperative 
Obstacle to return to the labour 
market (?)  
VAT cut Temporary; cooperative Impact on prices is uncertain;  
indexation management; 
deflationary risk 
Companies’ tax cuts Temporary  Does not benefit to firms in 
difficulty; impact on investment 
uncertain; anti-cooperative 
Firms’ subsidies Temporary (?): may be targeted 
towards innovative or in 
difficulty firms  
Difficult to implement; may 
introduce distortions; anti-
cooperative 
Employers’ social contribution 
cuts 
Temporary Impact on investment uncertain; 
anti-cooperative  
 
If fiscal policy is seen as temporary, then private agents may fear that the end of the fiscal 
stimulus will depress activity. It should be announced that the stimulus will last as long as 
necessary.  
The housing sector is particularly hit by the crisis and should be supported. However 
countries like Spain have no alternative but reduce the weight of this sector in their 
economies. Investment goods sectors are also strongly affected by the crisis and cannot be so 
easily supported by fiscal policy: this is a problem for Germany.  
The needs for a rapid stimulus (supporting existing sectors) may come in contradiction with 
long-term needs (shifting production towards less energy-intensive and more 
environmentally-friendly processes).  
In a situation of insufficient demand, output needs to be substantially supported. The IMF had 
suggested a fiscal stimulus of 2% of GDP at the world level; the European Commission of 
around 1.5% of GDP at the EU level.  
Ideally policies should be strongly coordinated in order to: 
- Prevent free riding behaviours (some countries benefiting from the stimulus policy in 
neighbour countries),  
- Avoid strategies with detrimental effects on other countries (exchange rate depreciation, 
wage moderation, protectionism)  
- Design a long-term strategy (in particular as concerns the financial system and taxation)  
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But coordination takes time and is difficult to settle. Each country has reasons for doing less 
than other countries: EU countries may request the bulk of the effort to be made by the US, 
responsible for the crisis, but the US may reply that on the contrary the crisis is due to the fact 
that in the past the US was the only country to support world growth; Germany may not wish 
to undermine its previous restructuring efforts although this efforts are viewed as counter-
productive by EU partners.  
The current crisis has highlighted the general problem of fiscal policy: the rise in public 
deficits and debt. This should come to an end at some point, but without pushing the 
economies back to the crisis. The level of public debt has been permanently increased under 
the effects of the crisis. Once the crisis is over, can the implementation of a durably restrictive 
fiscal policy stance be avoided?  
3. The French fiscal policies during the crisis 
3.1. French fiscal specificities 
France has remained a mixed economy with a high level of public spending and taxation, 
persistent public deficits and a rather Keynesian fiscal policy. France has not implemented an 
extensive programme of structural liberal reforms, because of the disapproval in the 
population, of the State tradition and of the lack of enthusiasm among leading classes, closely 
linked to the State. 
In his 2007 electoral campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy set the objective of substantial cuts in 
taxation levels and public deficits which should imply dramatic public spending cuts (but the 
contents of the strategy were never totally unveiled, except for the reduction in waste of 
public money and in the number of public servants). 
This objective was based on:  
- ‘liberal’ considerations (lower tax rates will boost employment, savings, investment, and 
so production) 
- the difficulty to maintain high taxation in the context of globalisation and the European 
single market without tax harmonisation.  
In 2007-2008, the French government cut taxes but did not succeed in reducing substantially 
public spending. In the crisis, France has had difficulty to implement a large-scale temporary 
fiscal stimulus. There is a contradiction between the need to increase public expenditures and 
the desire to reduce them structurally. Most of the implemented tax cuts will be permanent. 
The discretionary stabilisation measures were insufficient. But, due the weight of automatic 
stabilisers, France was less hit by the crisis than most EU countries. Nevertheless, France has 
now to face a structural crisis of its public finances.  
3.2. A relatively high public spending  
The weight of public spending has remained high in France: 52.7% of GDP in 2008 as 
compared to 46.8% in the euro area (see Chart 1).  
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Chart 1. Public spending, as a percentage of GDP 
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Note: Total expenditure: general government:- Excessive deficit procedure (Including one-off proceeds (treated 
as negative expenditure) relative to the allocation of mobile phone licences (UMTS)) 
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database. 
Contrary to most euro area countries, France has made very limited effort to cut the weight of 
public spending in GDP (table 6). France benefited less than the area average from the 
reduction on public debt interest payments. In 1990, public spending amounted to 49.5% of 
GDP in France i.e. 1 percentage less than the euro area average. In 2007, the ratio was 6 
percentage points above the euro area average. In 2007, France became the EU country with 
the highest public spending level as a percentage of GDP.  
Table 6. Public spending growth (in real terms)  
In % per year 
  1991/2001 2001/2008 
France:  
GDP 
Public expenditures 
 
2.05 
2.25 
 
1.6 
1.9 
Euro area :  
GDP 
Public expenditures 
 
2.1 
1.7 
 
1.6 
1.5 
Sources: OECD, OFCE calculations.  
The weight of primary public spending in GDP has remained stable since 1990 in the EU-15 
taken as a whole. There have been significant cuts in some countries: the Netherlands (7 
percentage points), Sweden (6.5 percentage points), Spain (4 percentage points), either 
because of social protection privatisation or because of rapid GDP growth. But public 
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spending as a percentage of GDP has risen in some other countries: Portugal (10 percentage 
points), UK, Belgium and Greece (4 percentage points). It increased by 2.5 percentage points 
in France, where it was already at a relatively high level. 
Table 7. Primary public spending in EU countries  
Primary public spending, as a % of potential GDP   
1990 2000 2007 
Germany 42.6 45.2 41.5 
Austria 48.5 49.2 47.7 
Belgium 41.0 43.0 45.1 
Finland 48.4 46.3 46.7 
France 47.5 49.1 50.1 
Greece 36.1 39.5 40.0 
Ireland 36.2 31.1 35.5 
Italy 43.4 41.7 43.3 
Spain 41.2 36.4 37.3 
Netherlands 50.5 42.5 43.4 
Portugal 33.0 41.3 42.7 
Denmark 48.5 51.3 50.0 
UK 38.8 38.0 42.8 
Sweden 56.4 53.7 50.0 
EU-15 43.4 43.2 43.7 
Sources: OECD, OFCE calculations. 
Public spending composition  
Public spending is about 6 percentage points of GDP higher in France than in the euro area. 
The gap is particularly large in the field of social protection (including health) where public 
spending is almost 4 percentage points higher in France than in the euro area (table 8). France 
has an almost entirely public health system and pays generous housing and family benefits, 
family supports such as child care expenditure and support to mothers who leave their job to 
care after their young children; unemployment benefits are relatively generous; France has 
also a minimum income system; the basic and the complementary pension systems are public 
and older people are entitled to a generous minimum allowance. 
Public spending in education is 1 percentage point of GDP higher in France than in the euro 
area, due to a higher share of young people in the population and to the low level of private 
spending in education in France. Public spending is slightly higher in France in housing and 
collective infrastructure (0.9 percentage point) and in culture (0.5 percentage point).  
A large cut in public spending would require substantial cuts in public expenditures directly 
benefiting the population (health, pensions, family benefits, etc), which would be unpopular 
and questionable from a social point of view (inequalities would rise) and from an economic 
point of view (people would have to replace public expenditure by private ones; it is not 
certain that it would be more efficient for education, health, pensions,…). 
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Table 8. Government expenditure by function in 2007 
As a % of GDP 
 FR EA EU-15 
General public services 6.9 6.6 6.2 
Defence 1.8 1.3 1.5 
Public order and safety 1.3 1.6 1.7 
Economic affairs 2.8 3.9 3.7 
Environment protection 0.9 0.7 0.8 
Housing and community amenities 1.9 1.0 1.0 
Recreation, culture and religion 1.5 1.1 1.1 
Education 5.9 4.8 5.1 
Health 7.2 6.5 6.7 
Social Protection 22.2 18.8 18.8 
Total 52.3 46.1 46.1 
Source: Eurostat. 
Recent projects for large public spending cuts in France 
Since 1998, all updates of the Stability Programmes submitted by France have announced a 
significant deceleration of public spending growth. But this did not occur before 2006 (see 
Table 9). Public spending in volume grew by 2.1% in 2005 and slowed down to 1.1% in 
2006, 1.5% in 2007 and 1.2% in 2008. Public expenditures were managed with a strong 
discipline: for instance, family benefits, pensions, minimum incomes were indexed on prices 
only and not on wages. However, this did not allow for a reduction of public spending as a 
share of GDP. 
Table 9. Public expenditures growth, per year, in real terms 
In % 
 Stability programme Observed 
2000-2002 1.0 2.3 
2001-2003 1.3 2.5 
2002-2004 1.5 2.5 
2003-2005  1.3 2.2 
2004-2006 1.3 1.8 
2005-2007 1.1 1.6 
2006-2008 1.2 1.3 
2007-2009 0.6 2.0 
2008-2010 0.6 1.9 
2009-2012    1.125  
2011-2013 1.0  
Sources: OFCE calculations.  
Many texts (in particular the Pebereau’s Report) have called for a strong decrease of public 
spending in order to lower the tax burden on the productive sector. But this assumes that the 
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existing public expenditures are unnecessary. However, many public expenditures are useful 
to growth (education, research) or production (infrastructure, child care support). Others are 
crucial for households (health, retirement) and their reduction would have to be offset by 
increased private insurance spending, at a similar or higher cost. Finally, some reflect a social 
choice for a society with more solidarity (minimum income, unemployment benefits). While a 
rigorous management of public finances is needed, a social choice has to be made between 
public and private expenditure but we may think that households prefer more nurseries than 
more bank branches and that the ratio of teachers to golden boys’ wages should be increased 
rather than the opposite. 
The LOLF (‘Loi organique relative aux Lois de Finances’) adopted in 2001 and enforced 
from 2006 has modified management practices and adoption rules of the French budget. 
Expenditure limits are classified into 120 programmes, then grouped in ‘missions’. The 
manager of each ‘mission’ has a certain degree of freedom to reallocate expenditure. The 
outcomes of each mission are controlled through precise indicators. Performance reports are 
expected to control the evolution of indicators and budget costs. The LOLF aims at improving 
public spending efficiency. There is no certainty that it will allow to cut spending. For 
instance, as concerns family policy, the LOLF sets targets in terms of living standard parities 
for families relatively to couples without children, of child poverty rates and of child care; but 
the fulfilment of these targets would require an increase in public spending.   
According to the Attali’s Report (January 2008) the government and other pubic 
administrations should be substantially reformed and public spending should be cut and 
focused on some precise objectives. However, the Report recommends substantial 
programmes aiming at increasing infrastructure, supporting social housing, reducing the 
number of poor people down from 7 to 3 million, improving pre-primary, primary and higher 
education, adapting France to innovation. At the same time, the report advocates for cutting 
public expenditure by 1 percentage point per year during 5 years, which implies that public 
spending should grow by 0.5% per year only (the report even says 0). Are these objectives 
consistent? Yes, according to the report, owing to expenditure reallocations and development 
of private-public partnership. But is this credible? Some cuts recommended by the Report are 
arguable: reducing family allowances according to incomes (but the government has refused 
this measure); introducing a non-refundable payment on medical costs depending on incomes; 
abolishing a regional level of government administration - the ‘départements’ (but who will 
manage social assistance?). But the main idea is to increase efficiency, like abolishing a large 
part of support to companies, employment and housing which would be inefficient (but is this 
true?). The Report recommends a change in civil servants earnings’ growth rules. However, 
their average real wage decreased by 0.4% between 2000 and 2007 (as compared to an 
increase by 5.7% in the private sector). Can it decrease even more rapidly? The report 
recommends not to replace 2 civil servants over 3 retiring, i.e. a 8.5% cut in the number of 
civil servants in 5 years and a 5 billion euro reduction in costs (0.25% of GDP), the third of 
which would be allocated to civil servants’ wage increases. No evidence that substantial 
savings measures could be implemented is given.  
The General Revision of Public Policies intends to reduce public spending albeit increasing 
efficiency and quality of public intervention. Here also, there is a bet that more can be done at 
a lower cost, which avoids social choices to be debated and made. Public policies have been 
assessed by high civil servants and private consultants. Decisions are made by a steering 
committee in which the weight of the finance ministry is very high. On the contrary, the 
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opinions of the concerned administrations and especially of concerned people are not taken 
into consideration. The announced measures deal with merging some administration branches, 
reducing the field of the administration, privatising some tasks and abolishing some benefits. 
Most measures are arguable and it is not certain that the government could resist the 
opposition of people (and even administrations) involved. 
 Until now, the French governments have refused to cut massively public expenditure and 
especially benefits. Benefits slowly diminish in relative terms, but there is no massive 
privatisation of health, education or pensions systems; no massive cuts in family or assistance 
benefits. The EU pressure and liberal mainstream views on the one hand and the wish of the 
population on the other hand lead rooms for manoeuvre to be very small. 
3.3. French taxation system 
The French tax to GDP ratio increased significantly from 34% in 1974 to 42.5% in 1984 and 
remained stable at that level until 1993. It reached 44% in 1996 and remained roughly at that 
level until 2007, 4 percentage points above the EU15 average. In 2007, France ranked 3rd 
among OECD countries (behind Sweden and Belgium) in terms of tax to GDP ratio.  
Chart 2. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in France and Germany since 1970  
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Sources: OECD, Revenue Statistics; estimates for 2008 based on AMECO database, April 2009. 
Since 1984, French governments have considered that the tax-to-GDP ratio had reached a 
maximum and that structural adjustment would be done through spending cuts. Since it is 
difficult to cut spending levels in a short period of time, this choice explains the rapid rise in 
public deficits in 1992-1995 and later in 2002-2004. The government raised taxes in 1996-
1997 only because of the Maastricht binding rules.  
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According to Eurostat classification, taxation is slightly heavier on labour in France than in 
the EU-27. This is much more true for capital, which may be justified both from fairness and 
economic efficiency view points in a context of mass unemployment, but raises today a 
problem because of free movements of capital.  
Table 10. Implicit tax rates, 2007  
In % 
 France EA EU27 
Consumption 19.5 19.6 20.0 
Labour 41.3 38.7 36.5 
Capital 40.7 32.1 34.2 
Source: Taxation trends in the EU, Eurostat (2009). 
The French taxation system has four main features: 
- Households’ income taxation is especially weak (7.5% of GDP against 9.4% in the EU). 
This is partly offset by a high local taxation.  
- Employers’ social contributions are particularly high (11% of GDP against 7.2% in the 
EU). 
- Business tax is high (corporate tax, business tax (taxe professionnelle)) 
- Households’ wealth taxation is relatively high (tax on higher wealth ISF, estate and 
inheritance taxes). 
French taxation remained relatively redistributive, with some specific taxes like wealth 
taxation and business tax (taxe professionnelle) which make France an isolated example in 
Europe. The higher marginal tax rate earnings is 56.8% which is higher than in Germany 
(47.5%) or in UK (46.8%). 
The current French government is tempted to implement liberal reforms in order to adapt to 
globalisation, through lowering the tax burden on the most mobile factors: companies, capital, 
the highest wages or the wealthiest. At the same time, the government projects to cut labour 
taxation, although there is no budgetary room for manoeuvre and no implementation of a 
strategy of massive public spending cuts.    
3.4. French fiscal policy 
In 2007 and in 2008 - before the crisis-, France was the only large country in the euro area 
keeping a close to 3% of GDP public deficit and hence looked as the only ‘sinner’ in the area. 
In Germany and Italy, public deficits had been substantially reduced. France looked like the 
only country resisting the prevailing anti-Keynesian view in Europe. The latter inspires euro 
area economic policies, the independence of the ECB and the Stability and Growth Pact. This 
framework seems unable to support growth in Europe and thus France has some reasons for 
departing from this view.  
However, France does not explain its policy and does not seem to try to impulse a change in 
economic policy in Europe. France regularly promises to bring the government deficit back to 
0 and hence seems more like being unable to control its public finances than trying to 
implement another policy in the EU.  
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Table 11. French public balances according to the stability programmes 
General government balance (per cent of GDP)   
  Stability Programmes Actual 
  J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 J07 J08 J09   
98 -2.9                     -2.6 
99 -2.3 -2.1                   -1.8 
00   -1.7                   -1.5 
01     -1.0                 -1.6 
02 -1.2   -0.6 -1.4 -2.8             -3.2 
03   -0.5 -0.4 -1.3 -2.6 -4.0           -4.1 
04     0.2 -0.5 -2.1 -3.5           -3.6 
05       0 -1.6 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0       -3,0 
06         -1.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.9 -2.7     -2.4 
07           -1.5 -1.6 -2.6 -2.5 -2.4   -2.7 
08             -0.9 -1.9 -1.8 -2.3 -2.9 -3,4 
09               -1.0 -0.9 -1.7 -3.9 -8.2* 
10                 0.0 -1.2 -2.7 -8.5* 
11                   -0.6 -1.9   
12                   0.0 -1.1   
* French government 2009 forecast. 
Sources: European Commission, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
From 1998 to 2000, the fiscal stance was rather expansionary: France refused to implement 
restrictive policies, in order not to put the economic recovery at risk. In 2000, government 
deficits reached 1.5% of GDP. France was far from the 3% of GDP limit, but had not built 
any room for manoeuvre.  
In 2002-2003, in a context of a world economic slowdown, France ran an expansionary policy 
(1.5 percentage point of GDP) which added to the cyclical deficit and led deficits to reach 4% 
of GDP in 2003, like in Germany, initiating a crisis of the SGP in November 2003. At the 
whole euro area level, the fiscal impulse only reached 1.2 percentage point of GDP over these 
3 years, as compared to 6 percentage points in the US and 5.4 percentage points in the UK. 
From 2004 to 2006, while France had a small negative output gap, restrictive fiscal policies 
were run (1.6 percentage point), which allowed France not to reach the 3% of GDP limit.  
Fiscal policy was therefore pro-cyclical from 1994 to 1997 (due to the convergence process to 
the Maastricht criteria), in 2000 (for electoral purposes), from 2004 to 2006 (due to the lack of 
room of manoeuvre). On the contrary, fiscal policies were stabilising in 2002-2003 although 
probably insufficiently. 
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Table 12. Fiscal developments in France  
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Public balance -3.3 -2.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.7 -3.4 
Output gap -1.2 -0.1 0.7 2.4 1.8 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -2.4 
Cyclical component  -0.6 -0.1 0.3 1.2 0.9 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -1.2 
Interest payments 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.6 
Cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.2 -0.8 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 
Fiscal impulse   -0.2 -0.2 0.7 -0.2 1.0 0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 
Sustainability index* 1.0 0.5 0.3 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.6 
*Cyclically-adjusted primary balance less 0.5 output gap. Source: own calculations. 
Is the French public debt sustainable? 
The French public debt (according to Maastricht definition) reached 63.8% of GDP at the end 
of 2007. Since 1991, public debt rose by 28 percentage points of GDP in France, as compared 
to 8 percentage points for the euro area as a whole. Although in terms of debt trends, France 
performed less well than the average, the French debt level does not depart from most EU 
countries and even shows a more favourable position. The French debt level is below the euro 
area average (66.4%) and close to the US level (65%), well below Belgium (84%), Italy 
(106%) and Japan (181%).  
The Maastricht definition for government debt does not account for assets owned by the 
general government sector and among them financial assets. The general government sector 
owns substantial financial assets in France. At the end of 2007, the net financial debt was 34% 
of GDP in France. The French net public debt is well below the euro area average (43.5%), 
the Germany (43%), the US (43%) and Japan (80.4%).  
From 1995 to 2007, the net financial debt remained roughly stable in France (-3 percentage 
points of GDP). The rise in the French gross public debt was to a large extent offset by the 
rise in the value of financial assets owned by the general government sector. The choice made 
by EU authorities of a gross definition for the public debt is not neutral; it penalizes the 
countries where the government owns public firms. 
Table 13. General government accounts 
In % of GDP 
 1994 2007 2008 
Non financial assets 57.0 76.3 74.3 
Financial assets 30.5 45.4 42.2 
Debts 62.9 80.3 86.4 
Net value 24.6  41.5 30.1 
Source: INSEE, own calculations. 
 
If we take non financial assets into account, then the net value of general government sector 
was 41.5% of GDP in 2007. France is not indebted vis-à-vis the rest of the world: French net 
overseas assets are slightly positive, around 1% of GDP at the end 2007. 
Many definitions of public finance sustainability have been proposed:  
Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak 
 21
1. Fiscal policy is satisfactory when it does not generate an inflation rate above the 
central bank objective; it does not lead the central bank to set the interest rate above 
the nominal GDP growth rate; it does not induce an excessive external deficit. This is 
the case with the current French fiscal policy.  
2. Financial markets do not fear any default risk. French government debts are ranked 
AAA by notation agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Fitch ratings). Financial markets are 
willing to hold French government debt at low interest rates: in September 2009, 3.6% 
for 10-year bonds; in January 2009, 4.1% for 30-year bonds. 
3. We can define public finance sustainability as the stability of the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio. If the nominal interest rate is close to nominal GDP growth and if the stabilising 
discretionary measures may represent half of the output gap, the primary structural 
balance should be higher than half of the output gap. French public finances seems 
unsustainable from 2000 to 2004, sustainable since 2005 (table 12). 
4. The European commission defines sustainability as the stability of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in a scenario where tax rates are stable and public expenditures rise due to an 
ageing population (European Commission, 2009). But this definition is not acceptable: 
a country should not raise tax rates today because, in the future, its health or pensions 
expenditure will rise. A country has the right to envisage that its taxes rates will be 
increased when expenditures rise, not before. 
5.  If the objective is that net public debt equals general government assets, then the 
structural deficit should be higher than: net investment + government debt 
depreciation due to inflation + capital gains on owned shares. The upper limit for the 
French structural deficit is thus at around 2.8% of GDP, i.e.: net investment (1% of 
GDP) + debt depreciation (1.2%) + capital gains on shares (0.6%). 
Public finances need to be managed seriously, but in the light of these different indicators, the 
French public debt does not currently raise any sustainability problem.  
3.5. Nicolas Sarkozy’s fiscal policy (2007-2008) 
During the electoral campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy announced the objective of cutting the 
French tax-to-GDP ratio from 44% to 40%, at the EU average. He wanted to cut labour 
taxation (to give a work incentive to workers), companies’ taxation (to improve their 
competitiveness), and taxes on the wealthiest and high-income earners (to encourage them to 
remain in or come back to France). At the same time, France had a public deficit of 2.3% of 
GDP in 2006 and the government promised to cut it by at least 0.5 percentage points per year. 
Simultaneously, Nicolas Sarkozy promised to increase many social expenses and public 
spending for research and higher education; the new announced measures amounted to around 
32 billion euros per year. At the same time, Nicolas Sarkozy also announced a huge cut of 
total public spending although its content was not explained, except for a reduction of waste 
of public money, a reform of the pension system of public firms (the régimes spéciaux1) and 
to reduce the number of public servants by replacing only 1 over 2 retiring. 
Nicolas Sarkozy expected a robust growth. This growth would have been boosted by an 
increase in labour supply induced by measures increasing gains from work (the motto was 
                                                 
1 In fact, the government reformed the régimes spéciaux in 2008, but this reform had no financial impact in the 
short-term, as wages were increased to offset the degradation of the pension system.  
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‘work more to earn more’, ‘travaillez plus pour gagnez plus’) and by the shock of confidence 
that its liberal policy would induce for companies’ owners. This growth would have brought 
revenues allowing to finance the programme. 
This hope of robust growth has vanished with the crisis. The fiscal stimulus objective requires 
the government to boost public spending, which is in contradiction with its fiscal programme 
for the long run.  
On the revenue side, a tax package was adopted in the summer of 2007 (the ‘paquet fiscal’). It 
introduced an income tax reduction for mortgage interest payments, a tax cut for overtime 
worked hours, a significant reduction in inheritance taxation, a reduction of households’ 
wealth taxation and a ‘tax shield’ (the ‘bouclier fiscal’): households will not pay more than 
50% of their before-tax income in direct taxes, including the income tax, the local tax, the 
CSG (the social contribution), the ISF (the wealth tax). The tax shield benefits to the 
wealthiest households, especially to people who live in a flat that they own or rich people who 
do not realize their gains on their wealth (as implicit rents and unrealized gains are not 
included in their before-tax income). 
The government increased the research tax credit and abolished the local business tax (taxe 
professionnelle) on new investment spending. In 2009, the French government was allowed 
by its EU partners to cut VAT on restaurants, which is an expensive and inefficient measure 
that the government had promised to the restaurant lobby.  
In 2009, the government has decided to reform the local business tax. The reform will cost 7.3 
billion euros; the reduction will benefit mainly firms in the industrial sectors. 
In 2010, the government will introduce a carbon tax as an incentive for households and firms 
to reduce CO2 emissions. To avoid that this tax would unpopular, the amounts of the tax paid 
by households will be returned to them by a lump sum, although the French public deficit is 
large. 
Altogether, the permanent tax cuts amount to 1% of GDP.  
On the expenditure side, the RMI (minimum income, revenu minimum d’insertion) was 
transformed into the RSA (revenu de solidarité active). The reform provides a supplementary 
income for vulnerable workers and their family; it increases their gains when they return to 
work (but the impact will be small in the short run as the labour market situation dramatically 
deteriorates); the measure costs 1.5 billion euros and is financed by a levy of 1.1% on capital 
incomes. It is the only case where the government has increased taxation. 
The non-replacement of 1 over 2 civil servants who retire will amount to a 7 billion euros cut 
after 5 years. This measure is problematic in a context of high and rising unemployment. The 
reduction weighs mainly on teachers, which come in contradiction with the objective of 
raising the education level and diminishing social inequality through education.  
The whole set of fiscal measures will have increased the deficit by 0.8 of GDP on a 
permanent basis. France has undertaken its stimulus plan before the crisis.  
The government refuses any significant increase in the tax burden, believing that the tax rate 
is too high in France. The government refuses to reform the bouclier fiscal which protects the 
richest from any taxation rise. The government wants to rebalance public finances by 
reducing public expenditure. The strategy is to cut taxes first and to rely afterwards on the 
public deficit to force a reduction in expenditure. 
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Table 14. Permanent fiscal measures  
In billions euros 
 2007 2008 2009 Full year 
Mortgage tax reduction  -0.3 -1.1 -4.0 
Overtime work tax cuts -0.9 -3.3 -5.0 -5.0 
Wealth taxation  -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 
Inheritance taxation -0.4 -1.6 -2.0 -2.0 
VAT on restaurants     -1.2 -2.4 
Local taxation on firms  -3.0 -3.0 -7.3  
Flat tax on firms    -0.3 -1.6 
Research tax credit  -0.6 -1.2 -2.0 
Carbon tax    +1.4 
Tax on capital incomes    +1.3 +1.5 
Tax on health insurances   +1.1 +1.1 
Taxes -1.3 -9.2 -12.4 -21.5 
RSA      0.7 1.5 
Cuts in the number of civil servants   -1.4 -2.8 -7.0 
Expenditures  -1.4 -2.1 -5.5 
Source: Ministry for finance, own estimations. 
3.6. French policy answers to the crisis 
During the crisis, Nicolas Sarkozy has changed the tone of his speech, from a liberal to a 
social, interventionist and industrialist one. During the three G-20 summits, France advocated 
for a reform of financial markets and institutions and a reform of world economic governance. 
At Argonay, on 23 October 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy said: “The ideology of the market being 
powerful and the public being powerless died with the financial crisis. We must re-establish 
the world capitalism by giving the leading role of the entrepreneur and the worker, not the 
speculator”. He announced heavy public interventions:  
1. "Alongside investment in universities, research and the environment, we are going to 
invest heavily in the digital economy, which will be the driver of future growth, along 
with clean technologies“ 
2. Introduction of a public intervention fund, “Fonds stratégique d’investissement” 
which could provide support to French strategic companies to protect their capital or 
help them finance their growth (capital: 20 billion euros; 14 billion in already made 
participation and 6 billions in available liquidity). 
3. Over three years, "175 billion euro of direct investment" will be injected by the 
government into economic activity 
4. Complete exemption from local business tax for investments made between now and 
the beginning of 2010. 
At the same time, he maintained a liberal strategy by making the legislation for work on 
Sundays more flexible. 
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French policy answers to the crisis: December 4th 2008 
The stimulus package announced in December 2008 was relatively limited in size (26 billion 
euros, i.e. 1.3% of GDP). But automatic stabilizers are high in France. The government 
refused to strongly support households’ consumption and preferred to focus on public 
investments and firms aids. The argument was that public investments prepare the future and 
do not increase the net public debt, while support to firms allows them to maintain 
employment, thus benefiting households. 
Public investments should be raised by 10.5 billons euros, of which 4 should be made by the 
State, 4 by Public companies and 2.5 by local authorities. The initial announcement was to 
implement all investment in 2009, but from the Finance Law adopted in early 2009, 70% of 
planned investment was expected to be implemented in 2009. In 2009, the government has 
made a lot of efforts to accelerate the implementation of these new investments, at the 
detriment of their relevance. For instance, the government has accepted to suspend urbanism 
rules and environmental objectives.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The stimulus package (4th December 2008): 26 billion euros (1.3% of GDP) 
Public investment: 10.5 billion euros (0.5% of GDP)  
General government investment: 4.0 bn 
— Infrastructure: 1.4 bn  
— Research and higher education: 0.7 bn  
— Military defence, public order and safety: 1.36 bn  
— Historical buildings. 0.6 bn 
    Public corporations’ investment: 4.0 bn  
— EDF (2.5), GDF Suez (0.2), RATP (0.45), SNCF (0.3), La Poste (0.6) 
    Support to local government investment: 2.5 bn  
— advance payment (€2.5 billion) of the 2008 FCTVA in 2009 (due to be paid in 2010). 
Support to companies: 11.4 billion euros (0.6% of GDP) 
— Reimbursement of sums due by the Treasury to companies. Reimbursement of research tax 
credit and VAT on a monthly basis.  
— Accelerated depreciation of investments made in 2009; 
Support to the housing sector and automobile sector: 2 billion euros (0.1% of GDP) 
 Housing sector: 1.8 bn 
— Doubling the size of the 0% interest rate mortgage credit: 0.6 bn 
— Building 100,000 houses: 0.6 bn 
— Urban renovation, specific investment in housing : 0.6bn 
Automobile sector: 0.2 bn,  
— car-scrapping scheme (prime à la casse)  
 Employment policies: 1.2 billion euros 
— Incentive for job creation in companies with less than 10 workers: 0.7 bn 
— Active employment policies (transition professionnelle contract): 0.5 bn 
Social policies   
                 —   Bonus for low-income earners: Prime de solidarité active (PSA). 
Social Summit (18th February 2009): 2 billion euros 
         —   Unemployment benefits: 0.25 bn 
          —   Family allowances: 0.8 bn 
          —   Income tax cut: 1.100 bn 
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The measures aimed to support companies are mainly cash-flow measures. The final cost is 
only interest payment: 6% on 10 billions euro (600 million per year). They may help firms 
facing short-term financing difficulties in the crisis.  
The prime de solidarité active (PSA, active solidarity bonus) is a €200 per household bonus, 
paid in one payment, in April 2009. It does not depend on the size of the family. The PSA was 
a temporary measure implemented before the introduction of the RSA in June 2009. It equals 
roughly two monthly RSA. It benefited 3.8 million low-income households: families at the 
minimum income (RMI, revenu minimum d’insertion), single parent allowance (API, 
Allocation de parent isolé), low-benefit unemployed, low-wage workers (single earning the 
minimum wage or slightly above, 2 minimum wages for couples, 3 minimum wages for 
families with 4 children). 
Social Summit (18th February 2009): 2 billion euros 
In February, when the crisis became deeper, the government organized a social summit and 
announced new and more targeted to households measures amounting to 2 billion euros.   
1. 250 million to improve unemployment benefits:  
 -  Benefits for part-time unemployment rise from 60% to 75% of the wage,  
 - 500 euro given to the unemployed who have worked more than 2 months but not 
enough to be entitled to the unemployment benefit.   
2. 450 million to families: 150 euros for the families entitled to the ARS (allocation de 
rentrée scolaire, a means-tested benefit for low-income families with children of school 
age). The benefit does not depend on the number of children.  
3. 200 million to low-income families (with children, disabled or old people) to buy 
services to the persons. 
4. 1,100 million for a reduction by 2/3 of income taxation for people at the first income 
bracket (at 5.5%) and for people at the lower range of the second bracket (14%). 
The introduction of a “Fonds d’investissement social” (Social Investment Fund) was also 
announced to finance young people’s participation in the labour market, reconversion and 
vocational training and part-time work schemes. The fund should be allocated 3 billion euros 
in 2009 (1.3 given par the State, 0.2 by the European Social Fund, 1.5 by the Unedic, the 
French unemployment fund managed by social partners).  
The social measures seem randomly spread among households (table 15): some benefits 
depend of the family size, some do not; tax cuts benefit middle-income families. Single 
people receive more than families, unless they earn more than 1.25 minimum wage. 
Households with an income of one minimum wage per unit of consumption can receive 0, or 
200 euros (single person) or 150 euros (family with 2 children). Among the poorest, the single 
are favoured; above a certain level of income, families are favoured.  
The total amount of these measures is rather low (2.8 billion, or 0.14% of GDP); the goal is 
more to support targeted households than to provide a large support for consumption. But the 
target has not been clearly defined between three groups of the population: the poorest, the 
victims of the crisis and “the most modest of the middle class”, which the government wanted 
to support for political reasons. 
The plan should have been more focused on the people hardest hit by the crisis: households 
becoming unemployed and people at risk of falling into poverty: the young who cannot find a 
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job and are not entitled to any benefit; the unemployed who reach the end of the period of 
benefit entitlement.  
Table 15. Random benefits?  
  
Income in 
minimum 
wage 
by uc PSA ARS Income tax Total 
Total 
by uc 
Single 0.5 0.5 200 0 0 200 200 
  1 1 200 0 0 200 200 
  1.25 1.25 0 0 0 0 0 
Couple 0.75 0.5 200 0 0 200 133 
  1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  1.875 1.25 0 0 234 234 156 
Family with  1.15 0.5 200 150  0 350  152  
2 children of 
school age 2.3 1 0 150  0 150  65  
  2.875 1.25 0 0 529 529 230 
Source: own estimations. 
What assessment of the French fiscal package? 
It is difficult to assess the impact of this fiscal plan: 
1. What is the amount of additional investments induced? Will they be implemented in 
2009 or later? 
2. What will be the impact of measures designed to improve companies’ cash-flow? 
According to OFCE’s estimates, the effective stimulus package amounts to 19 billion 
euros in 2009 and will have an effect of 0.8% of GDP (without Barro-Ricardo effect and 
without coordinated stimulus package effects, table 16). 
Table 16. An assessment of the French fiscal package: OFCE’s estimates 
In billion euros  Announced stimulus  
Effective in 
2009 Multiplier Impact on GDP 
Public investment 4 3 1.2 3.6 
Public corporations 
investment 4 2 1.2 2.4 
Local government 
investment 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.8 
Support to firms’ cash 
flow 11.4 7.1 0.4 2.8 
Housing sector 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.7 
Car industry 0.2 0.2 1.2 0.25 
Employment policies 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 
Social measures 2.8 2.8 0.8 2.25 
Total  28.0 (1.4% of GDP)
19.2 
(1.0% of GDP)   
16.0 
(0.8% of GDP)
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The French stimulus package has several drawbacks:  
1) Economic prospects have darkened since the plan was adopted. In November 2008, 
French GDP was expected to stagnate in 2009 - now forecasts are closer to -2.25% 
for 2009. The government has refused to adopt a second fiscal plan to support the 
economy. The main impulse of the plan is on public infrastructure, which is adapted 
in a longer term perspective. It includes some measures to support the automobile 
and housing sectors. But the impact remains too sector-oriented.  
2) It misses important measures to help productive sectors to restructure and make their 
technologies and their products greener.  
3) It includes too few measures on consumption, which would be more effective in the 
short-run. The benefits for low-income earners were relatively small.  
Nevertheless, France was less affected by the crisis than the other industrial large countries 
(table 17). France was less hit than the US, the UK and Spain by the housing crisis; less 
affected than the US and the UK by the fall in equity markets; less affected than Germany and 
Japan by world trade’s decline. French households’ consumption was automatically supported 
by the size of social benefits and by labour market rigidity; French GDP declined in value by 
1.5% from the 1st quarter of 2008 to the 2nd quarter of 2009, but households’ disposable 
income rose by 2.9% (for a 0.4% inflation rate) while firms’ gross operating surplus 
decreased by 6.7%; the French social model continues to protect households. Social benefits 
amounted to 0.2 percentage point of the 0.6% increase of households’ real disposable income 
in 2008; 1.45 point of 1.6% in 2009. Contrary to the US and the UK, France did not see a 
depreciation of its exchange rate and its fiscal impulse was rather limited.  
Table 17. The larger industrial economies in the crisis 
 GDP Consumption Investment Net exports Fiscal impulse 
United States -3.8 -1.8 -20.6 1.8 4.8 
Japan -7.1 -0.7 -25.6 -2.6 1.9 
United Kingdom -5.1 -3.1 -19.7 1.9 5.4 
Germany -4.9 1.0 -17.3 -4.7 0.8 
France -2.7 0.4 -7.1 -0.4 1.5 
Italy -6.2 -2.4 -25.8 -1.3 0.1 
Spain -4.0 1.0 -28.4 5.8 7.6 
Euro Area -4.2 -1.0 -18.4 -1.2 1.2 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, 2009/1. 
According to the government, the stimulus package would save about 100,000 jobs (which is 
compatible with a 0.8% growth impact). But unemployment has rapidly risen since the 
beginning of 2008: +600,000 up to August, i.e. 2.6 million unemployed, with the 
unemployment rate reaching 9.1% against 7.1% at the beginning of 2008. Unemployment is 
expected to continue to rise until the end of 2010 (3 million people unemployed and an 
unemployment rate of 10.6%).  
The government has chosen to not increase the number of subsidised jobs in the private and 
public sectors. Part-time unemployment was encouraged by an increase in the replacement 
rate (from 50 to 75%) and by an increase in the numbers of hours entitled to the benefit. At 
mid-2009, this was concerning around 320,000 workers. In France, social partners 
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implemented limited measures in terms of vocational training and part-time contrary to 
Germany where these measures were used to prevent employment to fall too substantially 
(table 18). 
Table 18. Change in GDP growth, employment and unemployment rate 
Q2-2009/Q1-2008 
 GDP, % Employment, % Unemployment rate, percentage point  
Germany -4.9 -0.8 –0.4 
Spain -4.0 -5.6 +9.3 
France -2.7 -1.9 +1.2 
Euro area -4.2 -2.3 +1.9 
UK -5.1 -2.6 +2.6 
USA -3.8 -3.6 +4.5 
Source: National sources. 
 
The crisis has led neither to a sharp decline nor to a sharp increase in French unemployment 
benefits. Two schemes (convention de reclassement personnalisé and contrat de transition 
professionnelle) allow for a replacement rate of 80% during the 1st year for people laid-off for 
economic reasons but they benefited only 75,000 persons at mid-2009. It would have been 
necessary to focus support on the long-term unemployed and on young people entering the 
labour market, for instance by extending by 6 months the period of benefit entitlement for all 
the unemployed during the crisis.  
Young people (15-25 year olds) are particularly affected by the crisis. Their unemployment 
rate rose from 17.4% to 23.9%, i.e. from 6.2 to 8.9% in terms of unemployed to population of 
the same age ratio (instead of 5.8 to 7.3% for 25-50 year olds). It would be necessary to give 
allowances to young people who have never worked (or did not accumulate sufficient rights 
to be entitled to unemployment benefits). In October 2009, the government decided to entitle 
young people to the RSA, although under very restrictive conditions (they must have already 
worked for two years). 
During the crisis, the French government refused to increase the level of unemployment 
benefits fearing that an increase would become permanent whereas its strategy is rather to 
reduce assistance and unemployment benefits to encourage people to work.  
Public finance sustainability? 
In 2009, permanent fiscal measures induce a fiscal impulse of 0.2% of GDP, the restrictive 
expenditure strategy reduces public expenditure by 0.3% of GDP, the stimulus package 
induces an impulse of 1.2% of GDP. There is an unexpected overshooting of fiscal revenues 
(mainly taxes on profits, but also VAT and social contributions). So the fiscal impulse is 
around 2.3% of GDP (table 19). 
In 2010, the stimulus package will be dramatically reduced. But the reform of the business tax 
will strongly reduce tax revenues. The government plans to continue its policy of public 
spending cuts. According to the Budget presented in October 2009, fiscal policy will be 
restrictive in 2010 by 0.5 percent of GDP. 
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In 2011, fiscal policy would be restrictive with the end of the stimulus package and a 
reduction of the overshooting effect. The fiscal impulse would be negative by around 1.4 
percentage point of GDP. But is this consistent with a satisfactory GDP growth?  
 
Table 19. French public finances (2008-2011) 
% of GDP, except * 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP growth*  0.4 -2.25 0.75 2.5 
Expenditures 52.3 52.6 55.3 55.6 54.8 
   +0.3 +3.0 +3.3 +2.5 
Interest payments 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
Unemployment benefits 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Stimulus package   0.6 0.3 0.0 
Permanent expenditures*  0.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Permanent expenditures  -0.7 -1.0 -1.4 -1.8 
      
Taxes 43.2 42.8 40.7 40.7 41.4 
  -0.4 -2.5 -2.5 -1.8 
Permanent measures  -0.4 -0.6 -1.5 -1.1 
Stimulus package   -0.6   
Overshooting   -1.3 -1.0 -0.7 
      
Public balance -2.7 -3.4 -8.2 -8.5 -7.0 
Cumulated fiscal impulse  -0.3  2.3 1.8 0.4 
* Growth rate, %. Source : own estimations. 
At the end of 2010, the French public deficit could reach 8.5 percent of GDP, 4.5 percentage 
points of cyclical deficit, 2.6 percentage points of interest payments and 1.7 percentage point 
of primary structural deficit (PSD) which are transitory (impact of the overshooting of tax 
revenues and of the business tax reduction, stimulus package). 
In principle, the French government should wait until GDP growth leads the cyclical deficit to 
disappear. France should accept a permanent deficit of 2.5 percentage points of GDP, which 
allows for a stabilisation of public debt at 60% of GDP.  
Nevertheless, we may fear that the huge output gap (-8.3% of GDP) will not rapidly 
disappear. GDP would have to grow by an annual 3.9% during 5 years to bring the output gap 
to 0, which looks unlikely. The risk is that the government is not brave enough to rely on 
growth and runs a restrictive policy, reducing GDP growth. 
Table 20 a shows the medium-term scenario judged the more likely by the government. GDP 
grows by 2.5% per year after 2010; the tax burden is stable (except for the overshooting 
which disappears); primary public expenditure increase by 1.2% per year. In such a scenario, 
the public deficit remains above 5% of GDP until 2014 and the public debt comes above 90% 
of GDP. The scenario assumes that GDP will continue to grow by 2.5% despite a restrictive 
fiscal policy, which requires robust activity in the private sector. 
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In fact, the French government may be tempted to bring public deficits more rapidly to 
balance. Table 20b shows a scenario where the government would succeed to cut by 0.2% per 
year primary public expenditure growth after 2012. The public debt ratio would stabilise at 
90% of GDP after 2013. The 3% limit would not be reached in 2015, where the public deficit 
would remain at 3.5% of GDP. But this scenario is unlikely from both an economic and a 
social point of view. The fiscal restrictive policy would have a strong negative impact on 
growth since the fiscal impulse would be -1.0 percentage point of GDP per year. 
Table 20 a. Fiscal developments in France  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PIB 0.4 -2.25 0.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Output gap -2.4 -6.8 -8.3 -8.0 -7.7 -7.4 -7.1 -6.8 
Public balance -3.4 - 8.2 -8.5 -7.55 -6.75 -6.1 -5.6 -5.1 
Cyclical balance  -1.2 -3.4 -4.15 -4.0 -3.85 -3.7 -3.55 -3.4 
Interest payments 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.35 3.5 
CAPB* 0.4 -2.2 -1.75 -0.65 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.8 
Fiscal impulse -0.3 2.6 -0.45 -1.1 -0.95 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
Public debt 67.4 74.9 81.7 85.6 88.6 90.8 92.5 93.6 
*Cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Source: own estimations. 
Table 20 b. Fiscal developments in France  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PIB 0.4 -2.25 0.75 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Output gap -2.4 -6.8 -8.3 -8.0 -7.7 -7.4 -7.1 -6.8 
Public balance -3.4 - 8.2 -8.5 -7.55 -6.65 -5.6 -4.5 -3.45 
Cyclical balance  -1.2 -3.4 -4.15 -4.0 -3.85 -3.7 -3.55 -3.4 
Interest payments 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.35 3.35 
CAPB* 0.4 -2.2 -1.75 -0.65 0.4 1.4 2.4 3.4 
Fiscal impulse -0.3 2.6 -0.45 -1.1 -1.05 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Public debt 67.4 74.9 81.7 85.6 88.5 90.3 90.9 90.5 
*Cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Source: own estimations. 
Table 20 c. Fiscal developments in France  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PIB 0.4 -2.25 0.75 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Output gap -2.4 -6.8 -8.3 -8.0 -6.7 -5.4 -4.1 -2.8 
Public balance -3.4 - 8.2 -8.5 -7.55 -6.25 -5.1 -4.15 -3.0 
Cyclical balance  -1.2 -3.4 -4.15 -4.0 -3.35 -2.7 -2.15 -1.4 
Interest payments 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
CAPB* 0.4 -2.2 -1.75 -0.65 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.8 
Fiscal impulse -0.3 2.6 -0.45 -1.1 -0.95 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
Public debt 67.4 74.9 81.7 85.6 87.2 87.8 87.4 85.9 
*Cyclically-adjusted primary balance. Source: own estimations. 
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The third scenario (table 20 c) illustrates a situation where the recovery would be strong: GDP 
would grow by 3.5% from 2012 to 2014. The output gap would quickly be reduced. The 
public debt ratio would decrease after 2013. The 3% of GDP limit would be reached in 2015. 
But this strong recovery seems unlikely today. 
The government would have to choose between a strong rise in taxation (which is contrary to 
its programme) and strong public expenditure cuts. The government considers that public 
expenditures can be lowered by reducing the amount of waste of public expenditure. But, in 
fact, dramatic public spending cuts require social expenditure cuts or to ask households to pay 
for education or to privatise pensions, education, health, … It would be difficult to tell people 
that, because of the crisis, they will have to subscribe health and pensions insurance offered 
by the financial institutions which caused the crisis.   
The government has announced a new pension reform in 2010. If it is necessary to increase 
the 55-65 year olds employment rate of in a long run perspective, it is counterproductive to 
introduce this debate in a situation where the unemployment rate is high and where the 
strategy decided in 2003 to induce firms to keep and hire older workers has not yet produced 
significant effects.   
In France few economists and politicians propose the introduction of a binding rule on public 
deficits. Nevertheless, in October 2009, some MP of the UMP have proposed “to prohibit 
unless exceptional period of crisis, to adopt a budget with a deficit beyond a certain 
percentage of GDP”, but the issue is “how to define a crisis” and “which percentage’? The 
only rule that would make sense from an economic point of view would be that “the structural 
deficit can not deviate from the golden rule by more than the amount of the output gap”. If we 
estimate that the output gap is -6.8% in 2009 then rule allows a 9% of GDP deficit in France. 
A national loan?  
In June 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the government will launch a national loan 
(emprunt national) in 2010. This loan is not needed to finance the public sector as France has 
no difficulty to get funding in the domestic and international markets. It is not decided yet if 
this loan will be opened to the general public (which may impose a higher cost to attract 
households) or only to financial markets (which is more likely). It is expected to amount 
between 30 and 50 billion euro (1.5 or 2% of GDP). 
This loan would finance “productive expenditures”, like research, universities, public 
infrastructures (transport, housings, urbanism), new or green technologies (electric cars), 
energy sectors (nuclear, solar). It could also finance the Fonds stratégique d’investissement, 
which is a public fund created in 2008 to take capital participation to help French innovative 
firms to develop or to securitize their capital.  
It is also a way to launch and to finance a second stimulus plan. 
At the same time, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that current public expenditures will continue 
to be cut, which is rather strange: more schools, less teachers; more research, less researchers.  
There is a contradiction in the French right-wing parties between a ‘liberal’ tradition (less 
State) and a ‘Gaullist’ one; France must have an industrial policy to guide and support firms; 
the State should show the way and finance innovations. The choice has not been made.  
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4. EU fiscal policies in the crisis 
4.1 An ineffective coordination 
At the beginning of 2008, the EU’s struggle against excessive public deficits appeared to have 
been successful (table 21). In June, the ECOFIN Council announced that no euro area country 
was under an excessive deficit procedure (EDP), while five countries in the euro area were 
under an EDP in 2006. In the first half of 2008, European Institutions welcomed the 10 years 
of the euro; they prepared the update of the Lisbon strategy. It is only at the beginning of 
October that the importance of the crisis started to be taken into account.  
The ECOFIN Council of 7 October 2008 stressed the need to curb inflation and to vigorously 
pursue the structural reforms: “wages should be supportive of employment and 
competitiveness” ; “fiscal prudence is necessary to support confidence notably in view of the 
ageing of the population” ; “relatively large European automatic stabilisers can help cushion 
the slowdown while respecting the 3% of GDP deficit threshold” ; “in countries facing more 
severe slowdown and where room for manoeuvre exists, temporary and targeted measures 
may be taken” . The depth of the crisis was not yet understood. 
Table 21. The Excessive Deficit Procedures  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Portugal 24/9… EDP ..11/5 22/6… EDP EDP …3/6 07/10… 
France   2/4… EDP EDP EDP …30/1   18/2… 
Germany 19/11… EDP EDP EDP EDP …16/5   07/10… 
Netherlands     28/4… …7/6       07/10… 
Greece     19/5… EDP EDP …16/5   18/2… 
Italy       16/6… EDP EDP …3/6  07/10… 
Spain               18/2… 
Ireland               18/2… 
Belgium        07/10… 
Austria        07/10… 
Slovenia        07/10… 
Slovakia   12/5… EDP EDP EDP …3/6 07/10… 
Malta     12/5… EDP EDP …16/5   13/5… 
Cyprus     12/5… EDP …11/6       
UK       21/9… EDP …12/9 11/6… EDP 
Czech Rep.     12/5… EDP EDP EDP …3/6 07/10… 
Poland     12/5… EDP EDP EDP …8/7 13/5… 
Hungary     12/5… EDP EDP EDP EDP EDP 
Latvia               18/2… 
Lithuania               13/5… 
Romania               13/5… 
 
On 27 November 2008, the Commission adopted “A European economic recovery plan”. The 
plan announced four objectives: stimulate demand, lessen the effect of the crisis on the most 
vulnerable people, pursue the structural reforms under the Lisbon strategy, and prepare the 
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conversion to a greener economy. The plan proposed a fiscal stimulus of 1.5% of GDP, the 
Member States being expected to implement coordinated fiscal measures of 1.2% of GDP and 
the EU providing a stimulus of 0.3% of EU GDP. However, the text remained vague on the 
content of the measures, their coordination and distribution among countries.  
Despite the crisis, the Commission continues to claim for public pension spending cuts and 
increased flexibility of the labour market: “Member States putting in place counter-cyclical 
measures should submit an updated Stability or Convergence Programme by the end of 
December 2008. This update should spell out the measures that will be put in place to reverse 
the fiscal deterioration and ensure long-term sustainability, in particular through reforms 
curbing the rise of age-related expenditures”; “A comprehensive recovery plan also needs to 
encompass ambitious structural reform agenda. A resilient, flexible economy helps mitigate 
the adverse impact of an economic crisis.” The Commission wants to control national fiscal 
policies, although it is unable to present an effective coordinated plan. 
In February 2009, the Commission initiated excessive deficit procedures (EDP) against 4 euro 
area countries. These countries have until 2012 to bring their deficit below the 3% limit. 
However, this would require a strong recovery of growth, which seems currently unlikely, or 
a restrictive fiscal policy in a period of depression. Once again, the Commission does not give 
a very helpful advice.  
On 19 March 2009 the European Council stated that the fiscal effort for 2009 and 2010 
amounted between 3 and 4% of GDP, adding cyclical and structural deficits. Member States 
must “quickly interrupt fiscal expansion, while continuing economic recovery”. We need “a 
coordinated strategy for public finances consolidation.” The Council is concerned with 
competitiveness disparities, but has been unable to propose a strategy different from “more 
wage flexibility”. In particular, the Council did nod ask Germany to increase domestic wages. 
On 19 June 2009 the European Council announced that the fiscal effort for 2009 and 2010 
amounted to 5% of GDP, including 1.8% of fiscal stimulus. “New measures of recovery 
would not be justified. MS should now focus on the consolidation of public finances.” 
Strangely, the Council recommends a non-cooperative strategy: “the small and open countries 
should focus on wage restraint while largest should support domestic demand.” The Council 
advocates for wage moderation and reforms of the national social security systems while 
recognizing that “social protection systems and social inclusion measures have played their 
role of automatic stabilizers and mechanisms to cushion the social impact of the recession and 
facilitate the return to the labour market.” 
It is difficult to assess the amount of national stimulus plans. The output fall has been so large 
that it is difficult to assess potential growth. The ex ante impact on public finances is also 
difficult to measure due to the importance of the fall in GDP (which has non-linear effects on 
some tax revenues) and to the fall of asset values. The public balances for 2009 and 2010 are 
not precisely known yet.  
The euro area deficit widened by 1.4 percentage points of GDP in 2008 as compared to 2007 
(against 2.3 in the UK and 3.7 in the US), by 4.5 percentage points in 2009 (9.4 in the UK and 
8.6 in the US), 6.3 percentage points in 2010 (10.2 in the UK and 10.3 in the US), see table 
22. 
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Table 22. Public balance (DG-ECFIN forecasts, Q1-2008 and Q3-2009)  
2007 2008 2009 2010    
  Q1-2008 Q3-2009 Q1-2008 Q3-2009 Q1-2008 Q3-2009 Q3-2009 
Belgium -0.2 - 0.2 -0.4 -1.2 -0.6 -5.9 -5.8 
Germany -0.2 - 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -3.4 -5.0 
Ireland 0.2 0.3 -1.4 -7.2 -1.7 -12.5 -14.7 
Greece -2.8 -3.3 -2.0 -7.7 -2.0 -12.7 -12.2 
Spain 2.2 1.9 0.6 -4.1 0.0 -11.2 -10.1 
France -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -3.4 -3.0 -8.3 -8.2 
Italy -1.5 -1.5 -2.3 -2.7 -2.4 -5.3 -5.3 
Netherlands 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.7 1.8 -4.7 -6.1 
Austria -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -4.3 -5.5 
Portugal -2.6 -2.6 -2.2 -2.7 -2.6 -8.0 -8.0 
Slovenia 0.5 0.0 -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 -6.3 -7.0 
Slovakia -2.2 -1.9 -2.0 -2.3 -2.3 -6.3 -6.0 
Finland 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.6 -2.8 -4.5 
Euro area -0.6 -0.6 -1.0 -2.0 -1.1 -6.4 -6.9 
Denmark 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 -2.0 -4.8 
Sweden 3.5 3.8 2.7 2.5 3.9 -2.1 -3.3 
UK -2.7 -2.7 -3.3 -5.0 -3.3 -12.1 -12.9 
Czech Rep. -1.6 -0.7 -1.4 -2.1 -1.1 -6.6 -5.5 
Hungary -5.5 -5.0 -4.0 -3.8 -4.1 -3.4 -4.2 
Poland -2.0 -1.9 -2.5 -3.6 -2.6 -6.4 -7.5 
Romania -2.5 -2.5 -2.9 -5.5 -3.7 -7.8 -6.8 
EU -0.9 -0.8 -1.2 -2.3 -1.3 -6.9 -7.5 
Source: European Commission, European Economic Forecast. 
 
Under the assumptions that the crisis does not affect potential growth and that the cyclical 
balance equals 50% of the output gap, the fiscal impulse cumulated from 2007 to 2009 would 
be 5 percentage points of GDP in the US and in the UK and 2 in the euro area (table 23). The 
fiscal stimulus was dramatically lower in the euro area. In the EU, public deficits are 
automatic rather than policy-induced. There were huge disparities between MS: the fiscal 
impulses were large in Spain and UK, weak in Germany and Austria, nil in Italy. Hungary 
and Czech Republic pursued fiscal consolidation during the crisis. 
Our estimations are lower than the estimations of the European Commission, which include a 
dramatic fall of the potential growth due to the financial crisis. But all estimations are fragile, 
due to the deepness of the recession. 
In October 2009, the Commission initiated an EDP against 8 euro area countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and one non-euro 
area country: the Czech Republic. Hence, among the 16 euro area countries, only three are not 
under an EDP: Cyprus, Finland and Luxembourg; the large majority of the EU member states 
are under an EDP: 20 out of 27 (Denmark, Estonia, Bulgaria, Sweden are not yet under an 
EDP). 
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Table 23. Fiscal impulse (cumulated since 2007) 
 2008 2009 2010 
Discrepancy 
debt/deficit  
2008-2010 
Belgium 0.6 (0.5) 3.0 (3.1) 2.6 (2.0) 6.7 
Germany 0.4 (0.2) 0.8 (0.3) 2.4 (1.7) 3.7 
Ireland 5.2 (3.1) 6.5 (1.4) 7.3 (0.7) 16.1 
Greece 3.4 (2.7) 6.7 (6.2) 4.7 (3.7) 3.6 
Spain 5.6 (4.7) 11.0 (8.0) 8.9 (5.9) 4.3 
France 0.0 (-0.3) 3.2 (2.4) 3.1 (1.8) 2.2 
Italy 0.4 (0.0) 0.8 (-0.6) 1.1 (-0.7) 1.8 
Netherlands -0.2 (-0.4) 1.7 (1.5) 2.9 (2.0) 10.7 
Austria 0.2 (-0.1) 1.4 (0.3) 2.3 (0.8) 6.5 
Portugal -0.3 (-0.7) 3.7 (2.2) 3.6 (1.6) 2.7 
Finland 0.3 (0.3) 3.6 (2.7) 5.3 (2.8) 9.5 
Euro area 1.0 (0.7) 3.1 (2.1) 3.3 (1.8) 4.1 
Denmark -0.4 (-0.4) 1.7 (1.6) 5.1 (3.9) 5.4 
Sweden 0.2 (-0.3) 2.0 (0.8) 3.5 (1.2) 2.3 
UK 1.8 (1.2) 7.0 (5.1) 7.1 (4.1) 7.4 
Czech Rep. 1.1 (0.1) 2.7 (-1.7) 1.0 (-4.2) -1.7 
Hungary -1.5 (-2.7) -4.5 (-7.7) -4.5 (-9.5) 4.1 
Poland 1.9 (2.0) 3.0 (2.8) 3.1 (2.3) 1.7 
EU 1.1 (0.8) 3.1 (2.3) 3.6 (1.8) 2.4 
USA n.a.(2.8) n.a.(5.2) n.a (6.5)   
Japan n.a.(0.3) n.a.(0.6) n.a (1.3)   
Source: European Commission, European Economic Forecast, with own calculations of output gap in 
bold.  
On 20 October 2009, the ECFIN Council recognized that “it is not yet time to withdraw the 
support government”. The Council announced that he will prepare “a coordinated fiscal exit 
strategy”. The consolidation should start in 2011 at the latest and should go beyond the 
benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per year. But the Council did not explain what countries should 
do if the recovery is not sufficient in 2011. The positive point is that the SGP and the 3% of 
GDP constraint are forgotten in the short and medium run. The ECB requested that 
consolidation begins in 2011, whatever the economic situation, and be at least 1% by year. 
Although some voices in Europe argue that governments should announce today when 
budgetary positions are back into balance in order to reassure markets, it is too early to make 
such a commitment since no one knows when the recession will be over. In November 2009, 
the Commission requires that countries whose public deficit exceeded the 3% return below 
this limit in 2012, 2013 or 2014, according to some arbitrary criteria. It is positive that the 
deadlines are so long but it remain unrealistic to fix constraints to fiscal policies disregarding 
economic developments.  
The Commission continues to watch gross public debts. However, the latter increase much 
more rapidly than the cumulated rise in public deficits and net debt since they incorporate 
government support to banks and companies (table 23). Focusing on gross public debts 
impedes government interventions, which are essential today because governments can 
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borrow more easily than banks or companies. The public debate and European surveillance 
should focus on net public debts. In the future, governments will have to choose between 
reducing their debt (in particular through selling back the financial institutions’ shares they 
have been buying in the crisis) and maintaining their debt in order to play a more important 
financial or industrial role. 
The Commission keeps on repeating that public debts should come down to 60% of GDP. But 
the crisis increases the need for households to own safe assets, especially to fund their 
pensions (as the Commission advocates also for lower public pensions). Companies are 
reluctant to borrow in view of the risk premium embedded in today's interest rates. The 
equilibrium level of the public debt has increased due to the crisis. Debts cannot rapidly come 
down to the levels they had before the crisis.  
The Commission continues to call for wage restraints, as if wage increases were responsible 
for the crisis. However, the wage share in value added declined by 2.3 percentage points 
between 2000 to 2007 in the euro area (by 4.7 percentage points in Austria, 2.3 in Germany 
and Spain). The Commission does not see that growth should be based on wages and social 
benefits and not on competitiveness or financial bubbles. 
Overall, EU institutions have been unable to implement a coordinated stimulus strategy. Each 
country chose its programme. Huge disparities remain in Europe and each country has their 
own points of view and interests. Some countries need more public infrastructures; some 
(Germany, France) have an important car industry, which they want to support. The British 
pound depreciated by 25% against the euro; the Swedish Krona by 10%. The UK decreased 
its main VAT rate, which does not provide any direct competitiveness advantage, but helps to 
fight against inflation. No strategy was proposed to reduce competiveness disparities between 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands on the one hand, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal on 
the other hand.  
On the whole, the fiscal stimulus has been too limited: in 2009, although the crisis came from 
Anglo-Saxon countries, GDP growth will be as depressed in the euro area (-3.9%) as in the 
UK (-4.3%) and more than in the US (-2.5%).  
EU institutions have not been able to implement a new growth strategy, and not even to 
launch a discussion: after the crisis, are the renovated PSC are the Lisbon strategy still 
relevant? For instance, what about States aids to companies? What about the choice between 
public pensions and pension funds? What future for the European industry? What is the 
optimal debt level? What governance in Europe to account for disparities between MS? What 
wage policy coordination?  
Yet Britain is planning to raise the retirement age from 65 to 66, to reduce state pensions and 
family allowances, to cut public investment; Britain will also introduce a maximum income 
tax rate of 50% (instead of 40%) in April 2010. The Netherlands announced a 20% cut in 
public expenditure in 2011: postponement of the retirement age from 65 to 67, abolition of the 
pension supplement for without income spouses, reduction of health reimbursements, lower 
family allowances. On the contrary, Spain announced VAT and income tax increases. 
Germany has announced a comprehensive programme to cut taxes from 2010 (24 billion euro, 
1% of GDP) while it had just passed a law creating a “debt brake” imposing a deficit of less 
than 0.35% of GDP from 2016. 
The risk is that governments try to make households pay for the crisis through lower social 
spending. It would be a suicide from a macroeconomic perspective (how to compensate for 
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declining demand? by a new financial bubble?), a microeconomic one (households are 
expected to buy their own health insurance and pensions offered by financial institutions 
which are responsible for the crisis) and a social one. If private spending increases effectively 
in the future entailing that the public deficit will be no longer necessary for macroeconomic 
purposes, then the choice between lower spending and higher taxes should be based on social 
trade-off between public spending utility and private spending utility. But the crisis has 
highlighted the risks arising from growing inequalities, which argues for higher taxes on 
highest incomes, on highest wealth, on financial and real estate gains, and on the financial 
sectors. The crisis has also highlighted the need to struggle against “tax and regulation 
heavens” and the need for some tax harmonization.  
4.2. A technical issue…which becomes a political one 
The estimation of the fiscal stimulus and the distinction between structural and cyclical 
deficits are based on the assessment of potential growth. But the OECD and the European 
Commission have lowered substantially their potential growth estimates over the last few 
months (table 24).  
24. Output gaps and potential output growth  
 Output Gap Potential output growth 
 2007 2000-2007 2008 2009 2010 
According 
to 
Autumn 
2007 
Spring 
2009 
Autumn 
2007 
Spring 
2009 
Autumn 
2007 
Spring 
2009 
Autumn
2007 
Spring
2009 
Autumn
2007 
Spring 
2009 
…OECD                     
USA 0.4 0.9 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.6   1.4 
Japan 0.2 3.3 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.6   0.7 
Germany 0.0 2.6 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.2   0.5 
France -0.3 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.3   1.0 
Euro area -0.3 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.1   0.5 
UK 0.4 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.2 2.7 1.5   1.0 
… ECFIN                    
Germany 0.3 2.7 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.9 0.7   0.8 
France -0.3 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.25 2.1 0.9   0.7 
Euro area -0.2 2.5 2.1 1.7 2.1 1.3 2.2 0.7   0.7 
UK -0.1 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.5 1.5 2.7 0.9   0.9 
Source: OECD, Economic outlook, European Commission, European Economic Forecast, own 
calculations. 
 
The OECD has revised downwards the euro area potential output level for 2009 by 3.0%, 
while the Commission has revised it by 5%. The annual potential growth rate of the area in 
2009-10 would be only 0.7% according to the EC. Such an estimate leads to increase 
significantly the size of structural deficit and of the fiscal impulse.  
In 2010, the French output gap would be -1.85% according to the new estimate; -7.5% 
according to the previous one. The structural primary deficit would be – 5% in the first case; -
2.1% in the second. The efforts required to bring primary structural deficits to balance are 
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very different. According to the French Ministry for Finance, French potential output growth 
slowed down from 2.1% per year between 2001 and 2007 to 1.7% since 2007. Since the 
European Commission now evaluates the potential growth rate at 0.7%, their estimate of the 
variation of the structural deficit will differ by 0.5 percent of GDP each year.   
What will be the GDP growth objective of the euro area in the coming years: 0.7 or 2.2% per 
year? The risk is that the choice of a low target is self-fulfilling as restrictive fiscal policy 
would be undertaken.  
Theses uncertainties question the notion of potential production and growth. In 2007, France 
had an unemployment rate of 8.3% without inflationary pressures. The European Commission 
said that France had an output gap of -0.3%. Can it be decided two years later that the output 
gap was 2.2% and so that France was running at above capacity in 2007? The recession led 
investment, and therefore production capacity, to fall. Should we conclude that potential 
output has declined? Should the rise of unemployment in the crisis be considered temporary 
or permanent?    
4.3. A difficult comparison… 
It is difficult to assess effective implemented policy actions: some countries include in their 
fiscal plans measures like price indexation of social benefits, transfers between different 
government levels, expenditures decided before the crisis; in some countries expansionary 
fiscal measures are implemented together with consolidation measures (like public sector jobs 
cuts in France or tax increases in Italy); some countries aggregate the fiscal impulse and the 
cyclical deficit. Government balance developments for 2009 and 2010 remain highly 
uncertain.  
One can write:  
Public balance = cyclical balance + structural balance + discretionary balance +one-off 
balance + interest payments. 
Fiscal impulse = - Δ (structural balance + discretionary balance + ? one-off balance). 
One-off balances include in 2009 the costs of banks rescue packages, the impact of the fall in 
asset values on tax receipts and the overshooting of tax revenues. However, whether one-off 
balances should be included in the fiscal impulse or not is unclear. 
Public deficits will rise substantially between 2007 and 2010 (table 25) but the output gap will 
have widened so much that the rise in deficits will be mainly cyclical. According to OECD’s 
June 2009 estimates, expansionary fiscal measures implemented since 2007 were substantial - 
amounting to 4 percent of GDP in the US, the UK, Spain but much smaller in Germany (1.5 
percent of GDP), France (1 percent of GDP) and even smaller in Japan (0.5) and Italy (0); at 
the euro area level, they amounted to 1.3 percentage point.  
Current fiscal plans cannot prevent the dramatic rise in unemployment (table 26). Are they 
insufficient or has fiscal policy become ineffective? The crisis has disrupted the functioning 
of the financial sector and generated a strong uncertainty on future world economic growth. 
The crisis has cut world equity wealth by $ 28,000 billion, i.e. 42% of annual GDP. It is 
difficult for fiscal policy alone to counterbalance such a huge shock. The rise in deficits may 
worry private agents, who fear today’s deficits will lead to future rises in taxation or decrease 
in social spending. They may also be afraid of the effect of the reversal of the fiscal policy 
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stance. If the depression lasts longer than currently expected, it will be difficult to maintain 
such deficits in 2011. But a too rapid consolidation may prevent any recovery. 
Table 25. Assessing fiscal plans 2007/2010 (OECD figures)                   As a percentage of GDP 
  Gov. balance 
2007 
Gov. balance 
2010 
Output gap Increase  
in deficit 
Fiscal impulse 
USA -2.9 -11.2 -6.3 (-10.7) 8.3 6.0 (3.8) 
Japan -2.5 -8.7 -9.4 (-12.8) 6.2 2.2 (0.5) 
UK -2.7 -14.0 -8.3 (-12.0) 11.3 5.5 (3.7) 
Germany -0.2 -6.2 -8.4 (-9.7) 6.0 2.1 (1.5) 
France -2.7 -7.9 -8.0 (-9.1) 5.2 1.4 (0.9) 
Italy -1.5 -5.8 -9.2 (-10.9) 4.3 0.5 (-0.3) 
Spain 2.2 -9.6 -7.7 (-13.8) 11.8 7.2 (4.2) 
Euro Area -0.7 -7.0 -9.0 (-10.9) 6.3 2.4 (1.3) 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, June 2009, with own calculations of output gap in bold.  
Table 26. OECD prospects for unemployment rates  
  2007 2010 (OECD forecasts) 
United States 4.6 10.1 
Japan 3.9 5.7 
Germany 8.3 11.6 
France 8.0 11.2 
UK 5.4 9.7 
Italy 6.2 10.2 
Spain 8.3 19.6 
ZE 7.4 12.0 
Source: OECD, 2009. 
4.4. Fiscal policy in debate 
Over time, fiscal multipliers’ estimates have become smaller out of large-scale 
macroeconomic models. For the euro area, for instance, fiscal multipliers were above 1.5 for 
government consumption in the first year (Wallis, 2004), but more recently, models estimate 
lower multipliers, well below 1 (or even 0.5 in DSGE models).  
The mainstream ideology in academic leading reviews is that a model must embed 
microeconomic foundations based on neo-classical hypotheses. Most models have become 
neo-classical. They assume that output cannot be very far from an equilibrium path, due to 
wage, price and spending adjustments. But these models are unable to explain the depth of the 
crisis. They assume that private agents and markets have forward-looking and rational 
expectations, which is not consistent with financial bubbles. In most models, public debt 
increases the long-term interest rate. But this mechanism does not have to play when public 
debt only compensates for the fall in private debts. People are assume to anticipate future tax 
rises when public debt increases, but if the rise in public deficit is cyclical then taxes will not 
have to rise in the future. The output rise will bring the public balance in equilibrium. 
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Moreover, even these models should suggest much higher multipliers in the current crisis, as 
Giavazzi (2009) recognises:  
1. The increasing degree of openness of the economies reduces the size of multipliers in 
case of isolated fiscal policy action. But, currently, there is a case for worldwide-
coordinated action. 
2. Credit crisis increases the proportion of liquidity-constrained households and firms. 
3. There is no doubt that the output gap will remain negative in the future period and that 
production is and will be constrained by demand. 
4. There is no doubt that the public deficit is due to automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary stabilising policies and not to excessive public expenditures. 
The rise in public deficits raises four issues which should not be overstated:  
The fear for inflation. The rise in public debts would generate inflationary pressures 
according to an awkward but widespread view. This is unfortunately very unlikely. The world 
economy suffers today from a substantial lack of demand. It is difficult to see where a strong 
pressure from higher demand or higher wages generating higher inflation would come from.  
Markets are indeed confident about the absence of inflationary risks: price-indexed bonds 
yields currently reflect 10-year ahead expected inflation at 1.8% in the US like in France and 
in the euro area (chart 3).  
 
Chart 3. Inflation rate expectations derived from interest rate differentials 
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The fear of a Barro-Ricardian effect. Households may observe the rise in government debts 
and may anticipate future tax rises and thus reduce their current consumption, which would 
lead active fiscal policy to be inefficient. 
1. Such a behaviour is probably not widespread among households.  
2. As the rise of public deficit is cyclical, taxes will not have to rise. It is the increase of 
activity which must equilibrate the public balance. 
3. The rise in public deficits and debts could generate a climate of uncertainty. But the 
saving rate will dramatically increase due to the fall in household’s wealth, the fall in 
credit supply and the rise in unemployment. It is difficult to determine if the public 
deficit will exacerbate this increase by increasing the perceived risks or will reduce it 
by showing that fiscal policy will support activity.   
4. Firms and workers may fear that government will be obliged to reduce too quickly its 
deficit, which would have a depressive effect. 
Governments must explain that budgetary positions will be brought back to balance thanks to 
higher output growth, not through higher taxation or social expenditures reduction.  
The fear for high interest rates. Under the same reasoning, no economic reason can induce a 
rise in long-term interest rates due to the actual level of public deficit and debt. Fiscal policies 
will become less expansionary when the output gap will return to zero; there no reason to 
predict that they will induce excessive demand in the future.  
But financial markets are not rational and their irrationality they may induce excessive long- 
term interest rates. The US 10-year interest rate fell from 4% in July 2008 to 2.5% in January 
2009; before rising to 3.5% in the middle of 2009. In France, the 10-year interest rate fell 
from 4.7% in July 2008 to 3.6% in January 2009, before rising to 3.5% in the middle of 2009 
(chart 4). The real interest rate remains at the level of potential growth.  
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The default risk. Markets do not anticipate that governments will be in default. They know 
that government borrowing will automatically be reduced when private consumption and 
investment grow again. They know that governments have no choice but borrow in the 
current circumstances since they are the only ones in which markets still have trust.  
 
4. 5. About the fiscal exit strategy 
More and more voices call for fiscal exit strategies. In October 2009, two distinguished 
European economists were invited to give papers at the informal ECOFIN meeting at 
Götenborg.  
Giavazzi (2009) explained that the fiscal stimulus was effective during the crisis because it 
was accompanied by an accommodative monetary policy and because the output gap was 
largely negative (but we do precisely need a fiscal stimulus under these circumstances). 
Giavazzi explained that governments should announce they will end the fiscal stimulus when 
the output gap comes back to zero to reassure financial markets and the ECB and to avoid a 
rise in interest rates. But it is obvious that the government will not run an expansionary policy 
forever; long-term interest rates did not increase during the crisis, despite the large rise in 
public debts. Giavazzi proposes cuts in future public retirement pensions to show the 
credibility of this announcement. At the same time he recognises that there is a need to induce 
households resume spending. How is it possible if households have to save more in view of 
their pensions? According to Giavazzi, public debts should return to their pre-crisis levels, but 
is this economically possible if households want to own more public debt assets because the 
crisis has shown financial markets fragility? The author proposes to counterbalance the fall in 
potential output by increasing labour force participation through labour taxation cuts, but one 
can observe that Nordic countries, where tax rates are higher, also have the higher 
participation rates. The only interesting proposal made by the author is that EU countries 
should undertake a coordinated increase in financial assets taxation. 
Pisani-Ferry (2009) presented again his old and unwise proposals: a commitment by 
governments to undertake consolidation strategy from 2010 to 2015, without accounting for 
the economic situation; setting independent Budgetary Councils; reducing public pensions. 
Pisani-Ferry fears that the expansionary fiscal policy will provoke inflationary pressures, 
which will induce the ECB to increase too quickly the interest rate and so coordination is 
needed. But this fear is not justified: inflation will accelerate only if there is strong demand 
revival which is unlikely in the years to come. If this revival shows up, public deficits will be 
reduced, automatically or with discretionary measures, but the timing of this retrenchment 
cannot be decided now. Pisani-Ferry proposes to retrench the value of bank capital held by the 
government from the public debt supervised by EU authorities. It is a step towards net debt 
supervision. It is fortunate that debt supervision by EU instances plays no role in the current 
situation.  
During the crisis, the IMF has exhorted governments to undertake large stimulus programmes. 
Nevertheless, two IMF economists, Cottarelli and Viñals (2009), have recently proposed an 
exit strategy which is not satisfying.  
Cottarelli and Viñals say that debts should come down to their pre-crisis levels, but without 
providing any analysis of the optimal public debt level. They do not give any analysis on the 
public debt level private agents wish to hold. They write that we must avoid that ‘concerns 
about high deficits and debt cause a surge in interest rates’, but we have not seen any rise in 
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2008-2009. The authors propose that countries adopt debt ratio objectives of 60% of GDP in 
2030. They evaluate the structural primary balance of advanced countries at -3.5% of GDP in 
2010 (including 1.5 percentage point of temporary fiscal stimulus2). They estimate that 
primary balances should increase at 4.5% of GDP in 2020 for debt ratios to reach 60% of 
GDP, which requires a negative fiscal impulse of 0.8% per year. The authors do not analyse 
the impact of this restrictive policy on growth. They must assume implicitly that there will be 
a deficit of private spending and that there will be a boom in investment or consumption, but 
we do not see why such a boom would occur and the authors do not say explicitly that the 
adjustment strategy depends on this boom. 
Of course, the authors advocate for structural reforms (more competitive goods markets, 
removal of labour market and tax distortions, but no financial markets reforms), but they 
recognise that: “there is too much uncertainty on both the magnitude and timing of the effects 
structural reform on potential growth to build a fiscal adjustment strategy primarily around 
this”. Of course too, they advocate for ‘fiscal rules and fiscal councils’. 
They propose to keep health and pensions spending constant in relation to GDP, but 
households would have to pay premiums to private institutions to obtain a satisfying 
coverage. The authors do not give evidence that this will be less expensive or more efficient. 
They propose to freeze all real primary spending but they implicitly suppose that these 
expenditures are not useful, or less useful than private ones, which remains to be proven. We 
do not understand why the financial crisis should lead to a decrease of the share of public 
spending in GDP. The authors propose to increase taxes by 3 percent of GDP by using 
externally correcting taxes (carbon taxation or sale of emission rights).   
In fact, even if the interest rate is 1 percentage point higher than the output growth rate, a 
primary public surplus of around 1% would stabilize the public debt at the level reached in 
2010 (around 90% of GDP): the required effort (after the end of the fiscal stimulus and 
overshooting) is only about 1 percent of GDP. Rising taxes by 1% of GDP should be 
sufficient. If necessary, taxation could be increased on capital gains (on financial assets or real 
estate), financial sectors, higher incomes and wealthiest people in a context of tax 
harmonisation in Europe (or in the world). The crisis should not be used as a pretext for 
introducing dramatic public spending cuts, especially as concerns social expenditures and 
pensions. 
5. Some concluding remarks 
The 2009-2010 fiscal stimulus was too low at the euro area level. It was too low in France and 
not sufficiently targeted on lower incomes, on the unemployed, and on part-time work (work 
shared with vocational training). 
European institutions were unable to change substantially their economic strategy to account 
for the crisis. The French government has modified, at least in words, his strategy, from a 
liberal one (break with the mixed economy; less social assistance, lower taxes on workers and 
entrepreneurs) to a new one: the re-foundation of capitalism, oriented towards productive 
                                                 
2 According to the authors, the structural permanent deficit increased by 2 percentage points between 2008 and 
2010, but this number incorporates the overshooting of fiscal revenues and a sudden fall of potential output 
during the crisis. 
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firms and workers at the detriment of the financial sector albeit keeping the objective of lower 
public and social expenses and lower taxation. 
Two main issues remain: can fiscal and monetary policies be expected to support activity if 
the crisis was caused by real and financial structural imbalances? Will the fiscal exit strategy 
be the opportunity for the leading classes to decrease public and social expenditures?  
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